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Abstract

This article proposes a legal framework to analyze the "high crime area" concept in Fourth Amendment
reasonable suspicion challenges. Under existing Supreme Court precedent, reviewing courts are allowed to
consider that an area is a "high crime area" as a factor to evaluate the reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment
stop. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). However, the Supreme Court has never defined a "high
crime area" and lower courts have not reached consensus on a definition. There is no agreement on what a
"high-crime area" is, whether it has geographic boundaries, whether it changes over time, whether it is
different in different parts of the country, whether there are different types of "high-crime areas," or who
determines that an area is, in fact, a higher crime area. Yet, after Wardlow, the concept has taken on controlling
significance in determining the constitutional protections of citizens located in certain neighborhoods.
Because new crime-mapping technology exists to generate objective and verifiable data on crime rates in
particular areas, this article proposes requiring the government to introduce this information in Fourth
Amendment suppression hearings. The goal is to provide guidance on how to establish a meaningful "high
crime area" definition for Fourth Amendment purposes. This article proposes a three-part framework to
identify a high crime area based on objective and quantifiable evidence. First, the "high crime area" in question
would have to be marked by a higher incidence of particularized criminal activity than other areas of the
jurisdiction. Second, the area at issue would have to be tailored to a specific geographic location and limited to
a recent temporal finding of criminal activity. Finally, there would have to be a demonstrated nexus between
the police officer's knowledge about a defined area and the reasonableness of the officer's observations in that
area. In this way there will a verifiable, particularized, and relevant definition of this important Fourth
Amendment concept. The article concludes that this type of data driven analysis is the only way to make sure
individual liberty is protected in all jurisdictions.
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Picture the following: On two separate street corners, in two
different neighborhoods, two men stand holding two identical paper
bags. Police officers patrolling each neighborhood looking for drug
dealers spot the men, and in response to police presence, each man
flees. One man runs through a poverty-stricken neighborhood
known for having the highest incidence of drug crime and murder in
the city. The other man runs through an affluent neighborhood that
has not had any recorded drug arrests or murders in over a year.
Under existing Supreme Court precedent, the police officers may be
legally entitled to stop the first man, but not the second. The Fourth
Amendment protections of each man are different simply because of
the neighborhood in which the police observation occurs. The fact
that the suspicious action and unprovoked flight occurs in a “highcrime area” alters the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion
analysis.
But, what if the area in which the first man fled did not have the
highest incidence of drug crime or murder in a given jurisdiction?
What if it was merely one of the many areas that suffered from
moderate levels of criminal activity in a city? What if the area had
undergone recent economic improvement and development,
reducing the amount of crime in a historically crime-ridden
neighborhood? Would it still be considered a high-crime area? What
if the area in question is known for a high incidence of car theft and
burglary, but not drugs or violent crime—should that affect the
police officer’s suspicions? What if the police officer thinks the area
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is a high-crime area, but in fact it turns out to be a rather low-crime
area compared to other areas? How should this affect the Fourth
Amendment calculus to determine reasonable suspicion? These are
the questions addressed in this Article.
1
“High-crime areas” are a fact of constitutional law: individuals in
those areas have different Fourth Amendment protections than they
2
would in other locations in the same town, city, or state. This
development represents a significant shift away from equal
constitutional protections for all citizens. In the context of Fourth
Amendment
police-citizen
“stops,”
high-crime
areas
are
3
constitutional realities that must be dealt with by any lawyer seeking
to protect Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches
4
and seizures.
5
In a series of Fourth Amendment cases from Adams v. Williams to
6
Illinois v. Wardlow, the Supreme Court of the United States has
7
considered the character of the neighborhood to be one factor in
8
finding “reasonable suspicion” to stop someone. While never yet
allowing the character of the neighborhood to be the sole
justification for a stop based on reasonable suspicion, it has narrowed
the totality of circumstances needed to two factors: “high-crime area”
9
and unprovoked flight from police. Lower courts have gone further
1. The term “high-crime area” was first used by the Supreme Court in Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147–48 (1972) (“While properly investigating the activity of a
person who was reported to be carrying narcotics and a concealed weapon and who
was sitting alone in a car in a high-crime area at 2:15 in the morning, Sgt. Connolly
had ample reason to fear for his safety.”).
2. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (recognizing that the
Court allows the fact that a stop occurs in a “high-crime area” to be taken into
consideration in performing a Terry analysis).
3. See infra Part I (tracing the use of the phrase “high-crime area” in Supreme
Court opinions).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
5. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
6. 528 U.S. 119 (2000). In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court found that “officers are
not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining
whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further
investigation.” Id. at 124.
7. Id. at 129.
8. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (establishing the reasonable
suspicion test).
9. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“In this case, moreover, it was not merely
respondent’s presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the
officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. Our cases
have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in
determining reasonable suspicion.”).
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and allowed a high-crime area combined with additional otherwise
innocent actions to constitute sufficient reasonable suspicion for a
10
stop. The term “high-crime area” has become a familiar “talismanic
11
litany” often quoted and almost always determinative in legitimating
the police conduct of stopping an individual. The conclusion in legal
opinions, among scholars, and on the street is the same: a high-crime
area designation almost always shifts the analytical balance toward a
finding of reasonable suspicion.
What exactly is a “high-crime area”? The Supreme Court has never
provided a definition. Lower court decisions are equally imprecise.
Yet, as practicing criminal defense lawyers know, the question is
highlighted in almost every Fourth Amendment suppression hearing
12
focused on the legitimacy of a police stop. A police officer takes the
stand, explains his actions, testifies to his suspicions, adds the magic
13
words—“high-crime area” —and reasonable suspicion is found as a
10. See, e.g., United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding
reasonable suspicion to stop person who tried to evade police near a
methamphetamine lab); United States v. Vargas, 369 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2004)
(finding reasonable suspicion to stop person because of his flight in a high-crime
area coupled with information from reliable source); Bolton v. Taylor, 367 F.3d 5, 9
(1st Cir. 2004) (finding reasonable suspicion to stop driver in known area of
prostitution because suspect quickly pulled out of parking lot upon seeing officer);
United States v. Jordan, 232 F.3d 447, 447–49 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding reasonable
suspicion to detain person seen running in a high-crime area because of knowledge
that nearby store had recently been robbed); United States v. Moore, 235 F.3d 700,
703–04 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding reasonable suspicion to search individual running
through an apartment building because apartment was in high-crime area and police
had observed suspicious people and known drug user leaving building).
11. See Curtis v. United States, 349 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C. 1975) (“[W]e eschew the
notion that the above facts assume added significance because they happen to have
occurred in a high crime area. This familiar talismanic litany, without a great deal
more, cannot support an inference that appellant was engaged in criminal
conduct.”); L. Darnell Weeden, It Is Not Right Under the Constitution To Stop and Frisk
Minority People Because They Don’t Look Right, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 829, 839
(1999) (“The courts have consistently considered the crime rate in a given
neighborhood as a relevant factor in justifying a police officer’s increased
suspiciousness of a suspect.”).
12. For a practicing criminal defense attorney, this reality is observed every day in
suppression hearings. Such suppression hearings involve application of the
exclusionary rule and are many times the only mechanism to effectuate a client’s
Fourth Amendment rights. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968)
(“In order to effectuate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, this Court long ago conferred upon defendants
in federal prosecutions the right, upon motion and proof, to have excluded from
trial evidence which had been secured by means of an unlawful search and seizure.
More recently, this Court has held that the ‘exclusionary rule is an essential part of
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . .’”) (citations omitted).
13. This phenomenon was recognized and criticized by a former prosecutor. See
Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I Am Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a Crime
in High Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135, 135 (2002) (“As an eager
young Assistant United States Attorney who ‘papered’ countless complaints,
conducted numerous hearings, and tried a substantial number of cases, I learned
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matter of constitutional law. Rarely is there any analysis of why this
particular area is a high-crime area, on what objective, verifiable, or
empirical data the police officer has based his conclusion, or whether
the officer knew this information before he made the stop. In fact,
trial courts rarely seem to question whether there is even an official
14
definition of a high-crime area in their jurisdiction, on what facts
that definition is based, whether the definition changes over time,
and whether there are different types of offense-specific areas (i.e.,
those areas known as “high drug areas,” “high theft areas,” “high
robbery areas,” etc.). Statistical data is rarely entered on the record
15
16
by the government. Outside experts are never consulted. The
high-crime area designation is hardly ever empirically supported with
factual evidentiary proof.
As a result, individuals’ Fourth
Amendment constitutional protections are altered without verifiable
17
18
“specific” and “objective” reasons to support that change.
This Article does not seek to challenge the use of the “high-crime
area” designation. Although scholars have criticized the term as
how to decode police officer jargon and law enforcement terminology. One of the
most commonly used—yet seldom defined—phrases was ‘high-crime area.’ . . .
Before court appearances, I would often question police officers about this
characterization. In court, however, judges rarely challenged the proffered label or
required its definition. Judges never asked officers for data to support assertions that
an area was high-crime.”).
14. But see United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 49 n.3 (1st Cir. 2007) (“None of
the officers offered boundaries or a definition of the ‘area’ being described as a
‘high crime area.’”); State v. Cooper, 830 So. 2d 440, 445 n.5 (La. Ct. App. 2002)
(“One is tempted to imagine a ‘low-crime area.’ Does such exist? Perhaps a few
high-dollar gated communities with moats, barbed wire and armed guards? Could it
be that the term ‘high crime area’ is so over-used, and crime is so rampant, that a
better definition of same today may be the entire State of Louisiana? Or is it just
where the poor folks live? Is this fair? Is it legal?”).
15. In criminal cases, as opposed to civil lawsuits, statistics are rarely, if ever,
introduced. The only criminal cases using such statistics are discussed in this Article.
See infra Part II.
16. However, experts are consulted in civil cases involving liability of stores and
other industries in high-crime areas. See, e.g., Henry v. Parrish of Jefferson, 835 So.
2d 912, 918 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (reviewing testimony introduced by plaintiff’s expert
regarding “high-crime area” designation in negligence suit); Simpson v. Boyd, 880
So. 2d 1047, 1052 (Miss. 2004) (assessing expert testimony as to whether building was
situated in “high-crime area” as part of negligence suit). There are no major
reported cases involving an expert testifying in a criminal case about a high-crime
area.
17. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (recognizing that the applicable test
under the Fourth Amendment requires that the police officer making a detention
“be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (paraphrasing
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1980)) (“In making reasonablesuspicion determinations, reviewing courts must look at the ‘totality of the
circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized
and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”).
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20

being racially biased, class biased, targeted to affect communities of
21
22
color, violative of First Amendment rights, and troubling
23
constitutional law, it is currently a reality of Fourth Amendment law.

19. See Amy Ronner, Fleeing While Black, the Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 383, 385 (2001) (“[T]he Wardlow Court effectively removed the
protections of the Fourth Amendment from individuals that need it the most,
namely minorities who have faced historic discrimination at the hands of the
police.”); Mia Carpiniello, Note, Striking a Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Person
Standard for “Location Plus Evasion” Terry Stops, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 355, 358 (2001)
(proposing a race-specific standard for reasonable suspicion: “[A] race specific
standard will force police officers and the Court to recognize the unique experience
of racial minorities in the United States and the significance of race in Terry stops.”).
20. See Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA.
L. REV. 391, 405 (2003) (“[L]iving in a high crime (poor) neighborhood, while not
sufficient in itself to give police reasonable suspicion to stop individuals, can
authorize detention on relatively little else, such as when the person runs from the
police, despite the fact that many poor people, especially African American ones in
certain urban areas, do not want to deal with the police even when innocent of any
crime.”); Brian D. Walsh, Note, Illinois v. Wardlow: High Crime Areas, Flight, and the
Fourth Amendment, 54 ARK. L. REV. 879, 913–14 (2002) (“Wardlow increases the burden
on innocent residents of ‘high-crime’ areas. Not only do those residents still have
the problems associated with living in a ‘high-crime’ area, but Wardlow has now
increased their risk of being detained by police.”).
21. See David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 677–78 (1994) (“It will not surprise anyone who
lives or works in an urban center to learn that these areas share another
characteristic in addition to the presence of crime: they are racially segregated.
African Americans and Hispanic Americans make up almost all of the population in
most of the neighborhoods the police regard as high crime areas.”); Lewis R. Katz,
Terry v. Ohio at Thirty Five: A Revisionist’s View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 493–94 (2004)
(“‘[H]igh crime area’ becomes a centerpiece of the Terry analysis, serving almost as a
talismanic signal justifying investigative stops. Location in America, in this context, is
a proxy for race or ethnicity. By sanctioning investigative stops on little more than
the area in which the stop takes place, the phrase ‘high crime area’ has the effect of
criminalizing race. It is as though a black man standing on a street corner or sitting
in a legally parked car has become the equivalent to ‘driving while black’ for
motorists.”); David Seawell, Wardlow’s Case: A Call To Broaden the Perspective of
American Criminal Law, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1119, 1131 (2001) (“Due to the politics of
past and present racism, minority members are often forced to live in povertystricken, crime-riddled communities, and this segregation continues despite raceneutral policies. Therefore, the high crime area designation as a basis for increased
legal justification of police, and diminished expectations of privacy for residents, only
perpetuate this distrust and the politics of identification.”).
22. See Herbert, supra note 13, at 158 (arguing that flight from police is a
protected means of non-verbal communication protected by the First Amendment).
23. See, e.g., Stanley A. Goldman, To Flee or Not To Flee—That Is the Question: Flight
as Furtive Gesture, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 557, 572 (2001) (exploring how judges attempt to
find a constitutionally acceptable definition of “high-crime area” without questioning
the designation itself); Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street:
Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 99, 120–22 (1999) (“The result is an extraordinary body of case law, in which
strikingly similar behaviors in high crime areas lead to wildly different outcomes. In
a high crime area, sitting in a car in a parking lot late at night may create reasonable
suspicion in Georgia, but not in Tennessee, and standing on a street corner may
create reasonable suspicion in Louisiana, but not in Pennsylvania, even though these
jurisdictions apply the same standard.”) (citations omitted).
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This Article instead seeks to bring intellectual honesty and objective
clarity to the existing constitutional framework.
Because the “high-crime area” designation is a fact of constitutional
jurisprudence, this Article suggests that courts must begin taking
seriously the requirement that the term be based on objective,
quantifiable—statistical or otherwise—settled data, rather than
allowing the designation of “high-crime areas” to be based on
subjective assertions or unprovable suspicions. As will be discussed in
detail, such objective evidence can be entered into the record
through statistical data, expert testimony, or official police
24
department reports. This evidence can then be subjected to crossexamination and ruled on by the trial court. Like other contested
facts in the suppression hearing, only in this way will appellate courts
and commentators be able to evaluate the usefulness of this legal
terminology.
The technology to generate the necessary objective data to
characterize a neighborhood’s crime rate has now reached a
25
sufficient maturity to be useful for litigants and courts.
Neighborhood mapping systems and computer crime pattern
technology currently exists with a sophistication that was only
developing when the Supreme Court announced its adoption of the
26
“high-crime area” concept.
For the first time, it is possible to
compile the statistics and catalogue the number of arrests and crime
27
patterns in a neighborhood or city. It is, thus, possible to determine
if a specifically delineated geographical area is, in fact, “higher crime”
than another area. Many police districts use this information for

24. See infra Part III (discussing the sophistication and prevalence of crime
mapping data).
25. See Luc Anselin et al., Spatial Analyses of Crime, in 4 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000,
MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 213 (David Duffee ed., 2000),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_4/04e.pdf (“Many of the
capabilities to support computerized mapping and spatial statistical analysis emerged
only recently during the 1990s.”).
26. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (referring to the term “highcrime area” for the first time in a Supreme Court opinion).
27. See Anselin et al., supra note 25, at 215 (“Technological advances, primarily in
computer capabilities, are fundamental to recent analytical advances in the methods
available for analyzing place-based crime data. The advent of computer mapping
applications and accompanying geographic information systems (GIS) are crucial to
being able to measure and represent the spatial relationships in data. Perhaps the
most powerful analytical tools emerging from GIS technologies are (1) flexible
spatial aggregation capabilities to facilitate the measurement of place-based crime
and (2) simple contiguity matrices for representing neighbor relationships between
different areal units . . . . [C]omputer aided dispatch (CAD) systems of citizen calls to
police make it possible to systematically quantify varying levels of criminal activity at
different places within a city.”).
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staffing and resource allocation, but rarely does it make its way to
court. This Article suggests that the data should be included in the
Fourth Amendment analysis and refined in a way that offers clarity to
police, judges, and those individuals who live in high-crime
29
neighborhoods.
Part I of this Article explores the use of the “high-crime area”
designation in Fourth Amendment cases. Tracing the term in
Supreme Court opinions, it can be reasonably concluded that the
designation has grown in importance—occasionally being the
determinative, if not always admitted, factor in many Fourth
Amendment decisions. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois
30
v. Wardlow, the totality-of-the-circumstances test has devolved into a
test that is met with two factors: high-crime area and unprovoked
31
flight from police. Other courts have required even less. Thus, the
first Part seeks to establish the importance of getting the term right.
Part II demonstrates that despite its importance, there is no
definitional clarity to the “high-crime area” term now regularly used
by the courts post-Wardlow. In reviewing court opinions, most
striking is the lack of consistent analysis about the requirements of
32
high-crime areas. While some courts have questioned the lack of
33
objective basis for the term and have cautioned about over-reliance
on its use, few courts have sought to define the term. The second
Part sets out the problem faced by trial courts and lawyers litigating
the issue in the Fourth Amendment context.

28. See JOHN MARKOVIC & CHRISTOPHER STONE, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CRIME
MAPPING AND THE POLICING OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 7 (2000), available at
http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/156_232.pdf (recognizing that computerized
crime mapping is used to measure police performance and solve specific crime
problems).
29. This Article focuses on the narrow question of Fourth Amendment law.
However, other scholars have recognized the larger societal benefit of crime
mapping technologies. See id. at 1 (“Crime mapping offers a powerful way for police
and the public to define the patterns of crime that the police must address and track
how police actions affect crime. The maps allow constables and street officers, their
senior commanders, and public representatives to develop a common picture of
crime in an area, incorporate other information that may help explain crime
patterns and suggest solutions, and then monitor changes over time. In short, crime
mapping can make democratic policing not only possible, but practical.”).
30. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
31. See id. at 124–25 (finding that defendant’s presence in an “area known for
heavy narcotics trafficking” combined with defendant’s unprovoked flight from
police created reasonable suspicion that justified the officers’ stop of defendant).
32. Compare United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2007), with
United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004). These cases are discussed
in detail in Part II of this Article.
33. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2000)
(Kozinski, J., concurring). The Montero-Camargo case is discussed infra at Part II.
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Part III proposes a solution to the ambiguity, by requiring an
empirical and verifiable factual basis to support the assertion that an
area or neighborhood is a “high-crime area” before that information
may be used to evaluate a Fourth Amendment stop. This evidence of
the character of the area must be specific to the crime charged.
Furthermore, this objectively based knowledge must not only be
known to the individual officer, but must be known before making the
contested Fourth Amendment stop. In this way, the character of the
area will be directly and relevantly linked to the otherwise ambiguous
actions observed by the police officer. This objective factual basis can
be established with existing data regularly collected by law
enforcement organizations. Intriguingly, this solution was suggested
by the National Association of Police Organizations, Policemen
Benevolent and Protective Association of Illinois (“NAPO”) in its
34
amicus brief before the Supreme Court in the Wardlow case.
The concluding section of the Article summarizes the benefits of
providing definitional clarity to the term “high-crime area” and the
benefits of requiring the government to produce empirical evidence
of the area’s relevant characteristics. With increasing technological
sophistication, including crime mapping and data collection, “highcrime areas” can become an established fact to be decided by courts.
The result will be a more consistent and fair application of
constitutional principles. In addition, it may offer additional benefits
to law enforcement and community organizations. Empirical data
and consistent definitions for high-crime areas would help guarantee
that all citizens share the same Fourth Amendment protections.
I. HIGH-CRIME AREAS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S REASONABLE
SUSPICION REQUIREMENT
A. The History of the Use of the Term “High-Crime Area”
in the Supreme Court
35

A brief review of the Supreme Court case law from Terry v. Ohio to
36
Wardlow v. Illinois demonstrates that the “high-crime area” concept
has grown in acceptance, if not doctrinal clarity in recent decades.
The characterization of a neighborhood as a “high-crime area” has

34. Brief for National Ass’n of Police Organizations et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 7, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (No. 98-1036),
1999 WL 451226, at *7 [hereinafter NAPO Amicus Brief].
35. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
36. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
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developed into an important factor for determining reasonable
37
suspicion.
1. Terry v. Ohio
As is well established, prior to Terry, all Fourth Amendment
searches and seizures on the street had to be supported by probable
38
Terry operated as a turning point in Fourth Amendment
cause.
39
analysis. For the first time, the Court allowed law enforcement the
ability to search and seize individuals on less than probable cause. A
new test of reasonableness was put forth to balance the government’s
need to deter crime and the citizens’ interest in rights of personal
40
privacy against governmental invasion. The Court articulated a two41
prong analysis: first, whether the stop was reasonable, and second,
42
whether the search was likewise reasonable.
To satisfy the
37. See Raymond, supra note 23, at 100 (“Characterization of that neighborhood
as a ‘high crime area’ or one ‘known for drug trafficking’ is often critical to the
finding of reasonable suspicion.”).
38. E.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 635 (1991) (“Prior to Terry, the
Fourth Amendment proscribed any seizure of the person that was not supported by
the same probable-cause showing that would justify a custodial arrest.”).
39. See Harris, supra note 21, at 661 (“Terry v. Ohio broke new ground. For the
first time, the Supreme Court allowed searches and seizures in traditional on-thestreet encounters between police and citizens with less than probable cause.”).
40. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22.
41. Concerning the reasonableness of the stop, the Terry Court found that the
governmental need in this case was “effective crime prevention and detection,” which
“underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating
possibly criminal behavior” without probable cause to arrest. Id. at 22. The Court
found that none of Terry’s actions, taken individually, would compel a finding of
reasonable suspicion. See id. at 22–23 (“There is nothing unusual in two men
standing together on a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone. Nor is there
anything suspicious about people in such circumstances strolling up and down the
street, singly or in pairs. Store windows, moreover, are made to be looked in.”).
However, the Court found in that the aggregate, the present circumstances
“warranted further investigation.” Id. at 22. The Court did not reach a conclusion
about whether this action was reasonable or not, and therefore, there was no finding
that the stop itself was reasonable. See id. at 20 n.16 (“We thus decide nothing today
concerning the constitutional propriety of an investigative ‘seizure’ upon less than
probable cause for purposes of ‘detention’ and/or interrogation. Obviously, not all
personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons.
Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some
way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.
We cannot tell with any certainty upon this record whether any such ‘seizure’ took
place here prior to Officer McFadden’s initiation of physical contact for purposes of
searching Terry for weapons, and we thus may assume that up to that point no
intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights had occurred.”).
42. Concerning the reasonableness of the search, the Court announced a twoprong test: “[W]hether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether
it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.” Id. at 20.
When an officer is investigating suspicious behavior, another governmental
interest comes into play—the safety of the officer. Id. at 23. The Court held that due
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requirement of reasonableness, the government was required to
demonstrate objective evidence that would “‘warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was
43
Since “there is ‘no ready test for determining
appropriate.”
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize]
44
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails,’” the
Court first looked to the governmental interest affected. In Terry, the
Court found that the governmental interest was “effective crime
45
prevention and detection.” Contrasting this governmental interest
was the individual’s right to be free from governmental intrusion,
since even a simple pat-down is “a serious intrusion upon the sanctity
46
The Court’s initial determination on what was
of the person.”
reasonable is now well-established. Objective reasonableness is to be
based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
reasonable inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
47
intrusion.”
When evaluating the reasonable inferences, the
reviewing court must consider the officer’s experience and “due
weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which
to the potential for violence, “it would be unreasonable to require that police officers
take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.” Id. The officer may not
search a suspicious person in all circumstances; the officer must be “justified in
believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close
range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others,” in order to
search the suspect. Id. at 24. However, an officer does not have to be certain that
the suspect is presently armed and dangerous. Rather, the inquiry is “whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
his safety or that of others was in danger.” Id. at 27. The Court found that since
Officer McFadden had reasonable suspicion that the suspects were planning an
armed robbery, “it [was] reasonable to assume,” that the robbery would “be likely to
involve the use of weapons . . . .” Id. at 28. Therefore, Officer McFadden could
reasonably conclude that the suspects were presently armed and dangerous. Id.
Counterbalancing the governmental need of officer security is the citizen’s right to
be free from governmental “intrusion upon cherished personal security[,]” even if
only in limited searches. Id. at 24–25. Therefore, the search must be “reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.” Id. at 20. In order to be reasonably related, the Court created “a narrowly
drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the
police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual.” Id. at 27. The search must be “confined in scope to an
intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police officer,” id. at 29, and not for the purpose of
“prevent[ing] the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime.” Id. Since
Officer McFadden limited his protective search to a pat-down of the outer clothing of
appellants, the Court found that the search was reasonably related and thus satisfied
the second prong. Id. at 29–30.
43. Id. at 22.
44. Id. at 21 (internal citations omitted).
45. Id. at 22.
46. Id. at 17.
47. Id. at 21.

1598

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1587
48

he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” This
49
necessarily results in a case-by-case analysis. It is within this case-bycase factual analysis that the nature of the area in which the stop
occurs becomes of central concern.
High-crime areas after Terry
Over the years of interpreting the Terry rule, the Supreme Court
determined that one of the “facts” that could be articulated was the
character of the area in which officers saw the suspicious actions. In
50
1972, the Court decided Adams v. Williams and made its first
reference to the nature of the neighborhood as being relevant to the
reasonable suspicion calculus. In determining whether to uphold a
stop based on less than probable cause, the Court stated, “[w]hile
properly investigating the activity of a person who was reported to be
carrying narcotics and a concealed weapon and who was sitting alone
in a car in a high-crime area at 2:15 in the morning, Sgt. Connolly had
51
ample reason to fear for his safety,” and summarily search appellant.
In Adams, the Court reiterated that “a police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a
person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even
52
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” The Court
broadened Terry to include not only personally observed facts, but
also facts relayed to the officer by an informant, specifically rejecting
the argument that “reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can only be
53
The Court also
based on the officer’s personal observation.”
modified Terry by including the characterization of the area as a highcrime area as an articulable fact to be taken into account in
determining the reasonableness of the search. However, the Court
provided no guidance as to the meaning of the term “high-crime
54
area.”
2.

48. Id. at 27.
49. Id. at 29.
50. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
51. Id. at 147–48 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 145 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). Similar to Terry, there was little
analysis of the justification for the stop itself; instead the Court focused on the
propriety of the search. See id. at 147 (stating simply that “the information [provided
by the informant] carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer’s forcible
stop”). Justice Marshall’s dissent notes that “the testimony of the arresting officer in
the instant case patently fails to demonstrate that the informant was known to be
trustworthy and since it is also clear that the officer had no idea of the source of the
informant’s ‘knowledge,’ a search and seizure would have been illegal.” Id. at 157
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall further characterized the tip as
“unreliable, unsubstantiated, conclusory hearsay.” Id. at 159.
53. Id. at 147 (majority opinion).
54. Id.
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With this beginning, the Supreme Court began recognizing the
character of the neighborhood in more explicit ways. In United States
55
v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Court was faced with another Terry issue, this
56
time involving the stop of a car along the U.S.-Mexico border. The
Court in Brignoni-Ponce framed the issue as balancing the public
interest, which “demands effective measures to prevent the illegal
57
entry of aliens at the Mexican border,” against the interference with
“individual liberty that results when an officer stops an automobile
58
The Court in Brignoni-Ponce, after
and questions its occupants.”
reviewing Terry and Adams, held that the first prong of the Terry
analysis is satisfied “when an officer’s observations lead him
reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who
59
are illegally in the country.” In order to satisfy Terry’s second prong,
“[t]he officer may question the driver and passengers about their
citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain
suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must
60
After rejecting the
be based on consent or probable cause.”
argument that race alone could satisfy the Terry standard, the Court
noted that:
Officers may consider the characteristics of the area in which they
encounter a vehicle. Its proximity to the border, the usual patterns
of traffic on the particular road, and previous experience with alien
traffic are all relevant. They also may consider information about
61
recent illegal border crossings in the area.

In relying on the location of the stop, the Court gave legitimating
62
effect to the “high-crime area” reasoning in Adams.
63
In Brown v. Texas, the Court was asked to decide whether being
confronted in a high-crime area alone was enough to justify a Terry
64
stop. The Court reviewed the oft-repeated balancing test, and noted
that the determination necessarily involves weighing “the gravity of

55. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
56. Id. at 874.
57. Id. at 878.
58. Id. at 879.
59. Id. at 881.
60. Id. at 881–82.
61. Id. at 884–85 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
62. The Court held that when determining the reasonableness of the officer’s
conduct, “each case must turn on the totality of the particular circumstances,” a test
which was elaborated on in further cases. Id. at 885 n.10; see United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1980) (explaining that the “totality of circumstances” must
lead to a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity”).
63. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
64. Id. at 52.
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the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the
65
interference with individual liberty.” The officers in Brown could
only say that the appellant “looked suspicious,” but could not
articulate why he looked suspicious; the Court, therefore, eliminated
66
this factor from consideration. The only other factor the officer
67
gave was that the appellant was in a high-crime area. The Court
held that, standing alone, being in a high-crime area was “not a basis
for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal
68
conduct,” because the “appellant’s activity was no different from the
69
activity of other pedestrians in that neighborhood.” While stating
that being in a high-crime area is insufficient to show reasonable
suspicion, the Court did not exclude the factor from consideration,
so long as the officer could point to other facts that differentiated the
70
suspect from the community at large.
71
In United States v. Cortez, the Court took the opportunity to refine
what it meant by the “totality of the circumstances” test in the context
72
of reasonable suspicion. Cortez involved the investigatory stop of an
65. See id. at 51 (noting that the Fourth Amendment requires “specific, objective
facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular
individual or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying
explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers”).
66. Id. at 52.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 52.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 52 n.2 (“This situation is to be distinguished from the observations
of a trained, experienced police officer who is able to perceive and articulate
meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained
observer.”). Professor Raymond points out that mere probability, even a statistical
probability, cannot alone be sufficient for reasonable suspicion:
Something more than a purely probabilistic inference of suspicion based on
statistical likelihoods must be present to justify a stop. Consider a
hypothetical that concluded that, in a particular neighborhood, one person
in three was likely to be in possession of unlawful narcotics at any given time.
The probability that an individual in that neighborhood was in possession of
narcotics would be 33-1/3%. Notwithstanding the percentages (which would
appear to satisfy the probability requirements of the reasonable suspicion
standard), reasonable suspicion would not exist as to each individual in the
neighborhood. Some particularized observations—proof that implicates an
identified individual—must also be offered in support of the claim of
reasonable suspicion.
Raymond, supra note 23, at 105–06.
71. 449 U.S. 411 (1980).
72. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 n.10 (1975). This totality
of the circumstances test includes two parts. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418. First, the Court
must look at all the facts and circumstances, whether from objective observations,
police reports, or informants as well as take “consideration of the modes or patterns
of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers.” Id. Then, taking this objective data, “a
trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions . . . that might well elude an
untrained person.” Id. These inferences are not to be seen and weighed by scholars,

2008]

THE “HIGH-CRIME AREA” QUESTION

1601
73

The Court
automobile suspected of transporting illegal aliens.
reiterated that “[a]n investigatory stop must be justified by some
objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be,
74
engaged in criminal activity.” Part of the totality relied on by the
Court was the fact that this location was known for a particular type of
illegal activity. In Cortez, the suspicion focused on areas of known
illegal immigrant traffic, and thus the reasonable suspicion was tied
75
The Court deferred to officer
to that particular illegal activity.
experience based on a particularized understanding of the local
76
landscape.
B. Illinois v. Wardlow: High-Crime Areas and Reasonable Suspicion
The seminal Supreme Court case on high-crime areas is Illinois v.
77
Wardlow. In Wardlow, the Court held that unprovoked flight in a
high-crime area could constitute reasonable suspicion for a Terry
78
The factual circumstances and basis of the high-crime
stop.
determination are revealing and are addressed in some detail.
As detailed by the Illinois trial court, the arresting officer, Officer
Nolan, was in an eight-officer, four-car caravan proceeding along
West Van Buren Street in Chicago—an area that was “one of the

“but [are to be] understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.” Id.
The second part of the totality of the circumstances test is that the “process just
described must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is
engaged in wrongdoing.” Id.
73. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 413–16 (detailing that stop was based on long-term
immigration investigation and stopped vehicle fulfilled a number of suspected
criteria).
74. See id. at 417–18 (noting that to determine whether stop is justified, the
“totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account.
Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity”).
75. See id. at 419 (“Of critical importance, the officers knew that the area was a
crossing point for illegal aliens. They knew that it was common practice for persons
to lead aliens through the desert from the border to Highway 86, where they could—
by prearrangement—be picked up by a vehicle.”).
76. See id. at 418 (recognizing that “the evidence thus collected must be seen and
weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those
versed in the field of law enforcement”).
77. 528 U.S. 119 (2000); see, e.g., Debra Meek Nelson, Illinois v. Wardlow: A
Single Factor Totality, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 509, 510 (2001) (arguing that Wardlow is
“unprecedented in light of past Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding
reasonable suspicion and the significance of flight”); Ronner, supra note 19, at 384
(arguing that Wardlow “makes the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, a
principal means of curtailing police lawlessness, virtually inapplicable to the very
minority communities that need it the most”); Walsh, supra note 20, at 879
(explaining that Wardlow’s importance rests in its use of “unprovoked flight” and
“high-crime area” as the factors used to determine reasonable suspicion).
78. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 119.
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areas in the 11th District that’s high [in] narcotics traffic.” Officer
Nolan and his partner were in uniform, although he could not recall
whether any other officer was in uniform and he could not recollect
80
The
whether his car, or any other in the caravan, was marked.
officers observed the defendant standing along West Van Buren
81
When the defendant looked in the
Street, violating no laws.
officers’ direction, he fled through an alley and gangway with a white
82
plastic bag under his arm. Officer Nolan pursued the defendant
until the defendant eventually ran towards the officers’ car and was
83
forced to stop. Officer Nolan immediately conducted a pat-down of
the defendant and the bag both because he could not see inside the
84
plastic bag, and because in his experience, “it was common to find
85
weapons in the vicinity of such [high-crime] areas.” Officer Nolan
“felt a hard object that had a similar shape to a revolver or a gun,”
86
which was “very heavy.” Upon finding a .38-caliber handgun with
five live rounds inside the bag, Officer Nolan arrested the
87
defendant.
88
Wardlow moved to suppress the gun at trial and lost. On appeal,
the Illinois Court of Appeals discounted the “high-crime area” factor
of the Fourth Amendment calculus, and because the only other
89
factor was flight, reversed. The court found that Officer Nolan’s
testimony lacked specificity as to the particular area in which the
defendant was located, and questioned whether the defendant ran
90
because he thought that the officers were focusing on him.
Additionally, the court was concerned with the lack of evidence that
91
established the area as a high-crime area, and found “no support in
the record for the contention that defendant was in a high-crime
92
location.” The court noted that the location of an incident can be a

79. People v. Wardlow (Wardlow I), 678 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), aff’d,
701 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
80. Id. at 66.
81. Id.
82. Id. It was unknown whether the defendant actually saw any of the officers,
their cars, or their uniforms. Id.
83. See id. (detailing that no other cars in the caravan were involved in the stop).
84. Id. at 66.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 68.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 67 (“The record here is simply too vague to support the inference
that defendant was in a location with a high incidence of narcotics trafficking . . . .”).
92. Id. at 67–68.
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factor in the determination of reasonable suspicion, and together
94
with flight, may provide reasonable suspicion, but stated that in
order to “pass constitutional muster . . . the high crime area should
95
be a sufficiently localized and identifiable location.”
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the analysis of the court
of appeals, but affirmed the reversal of the trial court on different
96
grounds. First, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals’ determination that the testimony did not establish that the
97
area was a high-crime area, finding that it was a high-crime area.
The Illinois Supreme Court then reconsidered the issue of whether
flight in a high-crime area provides reasonable suspicion for a Terry
stop. The court first surveyed other jurisdictions and found that the
majority of courts held that “flight alone is insufficient to justify a
98
Terry stop.” The court held that flight in a high-crime area alone is
not enough, acknowledging that other “courts require proof of some
independently suspicious circumstance to corroborate the inference
of a guilty conscience associated with flight at the sight of the
99
After emphasizing the importance of protecting the
police.”
freedom to engage in such harmless activities as “loafing, loitering,
100
and nightwalking,” and “the right to travel, to locomotion, to
101
freedom of movement, and to associate with others,” as well as the
102
“right of law-abiding citizens to eschew interactions with the police,”
the court reasoned that “[i]f the police cannot constitutionally force
otherwise law-abiding citizens to move, the police cannot force those

93. See id. at 68 (“[A] high crime area is a place in which the character of the
area gives color to conduct which might not otherwise raise the suspicion of an
officer.”) (citations omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. People v. Wardlow (Wardlow II), 701 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S.
119 (2000).
97. See id. at 486 (“[W]e believe Officer Nolan’s uncontradicted and undisputed
testimony, which was accepted by the trial court, was sufficient to establish that the
incident occurred in a high-crime area.”).
98. See id. at 486 (citing State v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Neb. 1992)); see also
State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401, 407 (N.J. 1994) (“Although flight is evidence that a
fact finder may consider in assessing guilt . . . [it must] be accompanied by some
evidence of criminality.”).
99. Wardlow II, 701 N.E.2d at 486 (citing Hicks, 488 N.W.2d at 363); see also State
v. Sullivan, 203 A.2d 177, 192 (N.J. 1964) (“[F]or departure to take on the legal
significance of flight, there must be some circumstances present and unexplained
which, in conjunction with the leaving, reasonably justify an inference that it was
done with a consciousness of guilt and pursuant to an effort to avoid an accusation
based on that guilt.”).
100. Wardlow II, 701 N.E.2d at 487 (citations omitted).
101. Id. (citations omitted).
102. Id. (citing Hicks, 488 N.W.2d at 364).
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After
same citizens to stand still at the appearance of an officer.”
finding no other corroborating facts to support the inference of “a
consciousness of guilt,” the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower
104
court and ordered the gun suppressed.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Supreme
105
Court. After noting that presence in a high-crime area alone is not
106
enough to support reasonable suspicion, the Court reiterated that it
is nonetheless a salient factor to be considered because “[o]fficers are
not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in
determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to
107
The Court then noted that evasive
warrant further investigation.”
conduct can also be used in the reasonable suspicion calculus, and
found that “[h]eadlong flight . . . is the consummate act of evasion:
It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly
108
suggestive of such.” The Court confirmed that citizens indeed have
the right to go “about one’s business” and cannot be forcibly
detained and that refusal to cooperate cannot be a factor for
109
However, the Court went on to reject the
reasonable suspicion.
Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of flight by stating that
110
“unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate.”
Indeed, “[f]light, by its very nature, is not ‘going about one’s
111
business’; in fact, it is just the opposite.”
The Court rejected the
notion that because many innocent reasons exist for flight from the
police, flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity
by noting that conduct such as flight may well be ambiguous, but that
“Terry recognized that the officers could detain the individuals to
112
The majority also reasoned that because
resolve the ambiguity.”
“courts do not have available empirical studies dealing with
inferences drawn from suspicious behavior . . . we cannot reasonably
demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers
113
where none exists.”
Therefore, “the determination of reasonable
103. Id.
104. See id. at 486, 488 (noting “that defendant herein gave no outward indication
of involvement in illicit activity prior to the approach of Officer Nolan’s vehicle,” and
therefore “the officers lacked an articulable basis for suspecting defendant of
involvement in criminal activity prior to the point at which he turned and ran”).
105. Illinois v. Wardlow (Wardlow III), 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
106. Id. at 124 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 (1979)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 125.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 124–25.
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suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences
114
Part of that analysis, of course, is the
about human behavior.”
neighborhood in which the events take place. The Court concluded
that in a high-crime area, the type of unprovoked flight is sufficient
for reasonable suspicion.
The questions left unanswered by the Supreme Court’s analysis of
the high-crime area in Wardlow are considerable. While it no doubt
makes sense to consider the location in which suspicious activities are
observed, the major unresolved question is how lower courts should
consider that location. The next section discusses the impact of
Wardlow on courts struggling to define a high-crime area for Fourth
Amendment purposes.
II. A STRUGGLE FOR DEFINITIONS AND PROOF POST-WARDLOW
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Wardlow, courts can consider
whether an area is a high-crime area in a Fourth Amendment
reasonable suspicion calculus. Courts began labeling areas as highcrime without settling on a definition. For example, some courts
have defined a high-crime area as an area of “expected criminal
115
116
activity,” which fits within the language of Wardlow. Other courts
have described it as an area known for drug activity, or one under
117
surveillance.
Still other courts have held that a high-crime area is
one that is “riddled with narcotics dealings and drug-related
118
shootings.” Some courts have found that a “crime wave” can create
119
a high-crime area.
Being an area which is “notorious” or has a
reputation for illegal conduct can also qualify an area as high120
Areas “plagued by gang-related shootings, drug dealing,
crime.
114. Id. at 125.
115. See United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 791, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting
the defendant’s claim that “the government must produce ‘specific data’ establishing
that a location is a ‘high-crime area’ for this inference of criminality to be drawn
from the defendant’s flight,” and holding that location is relevant, not in a well
particularized “high-crime area” but rather an area of “expected criminal activity”).
116. See Wardlow III, 528 U.S. at 124 (“[P]resence in an area of expected criminal
activity.”).
117. State v. Biehl, No. 22054, 2004 WL 2806340, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8,
2004).
118. Cunningham v. State, 884 So. 2d 1121, 1122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
119. State v. Donnell, 239 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 1976).
120. See People v. Davis, 815 N.E.2d 92, 98–99 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that
“there was no evidence that the area around the convenience store was a ‘high crime
area’ or notorious for any type of criminal activity”); Slayton v. Commonwealth, 582
S.E.2d 448, 449 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (noting “the reputation of the location as a ‘high
crime area’ notorious for drug transactions”). But see State v. Hollimon, 900 So. 2d
999, 1004 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (putting higher emphasis on areas that are “notorious”
for certain crimes rather than areas that are simply “known for high crime and high
drug trafficking activity”).
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assaults, and robberies” may also be termed high-crime areas. This
122
“hodgepodge” of definitions demonstrates the importance of the
high-crime area label without actually clarifying what it means. How
does one know one is in a high-crime area?
How is the
determination that a location is a high-crime area made? These
questions are still unanswered. As Judge Kozinski of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized, “[t]he
question is not whether the characteristics of the area may be taken
123
into account, but how these characteristics are established.”
This
section seeks to explore the definitional problem of the “high-crime
area” terminology.
A. High-Crime Characteristics
The term “high-crime area,” for Fourth Amendment purposes,
expresses certain causal assumptions. First, most criminal cases
involving Fourth Amendment concerns take place in a physical,
124
geographical location.
Generally, this is a neighborhood, a street,
an intersection, a police district, or a particularized geographic area.
Second, this physical location can be compared to other locations
125
“High” would be a
that have a different level of criminal activity.
meaningless term if there did not exist lower areas of criminal
activity. Third, it is assumed that some evidence can be presented to
126
Beyond these basic
establish that an area is a “high-crime area.”
assumptions, however, there is little agreement on how courts should
evaluate claims that certain areas merit a high-crime designation.
121. United States v. Rogers, No. Crim. 10-10313, 2005 WL 478001, at *1 (D. Mass.
Mar. 1, 2005); see also United States v. Ford, 333 F.3d 839, 841 (6th Cir. 2003)
(finding that a skating rink could be a high-crime area because “gang members have
been known to patronize the rink, and screwdrivers and knives have been found by
the owner near the Roller Dome’s dumpster”).
122. See Raymond, supra note 23, at 100 (“[C]ourts, however, have little guidance
as to how to consider the [high-crime area] factor. The result is a hodgepodge of
inconsistent and incoherent case law.”).
123. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)
(Kozinski, J., concurring).
124. For example, each of the cases discussed in Part I involve a factual scenario
out of the physical world, be it District 11 in Chicago or on the United States-Mexico
border. High-crime areas would necessarily be different if we were talking about
cyber crime, or non-physical searches. For purposes of this Article we will focus on
the physical world and regular police-citizen face-to-face encounters.
125. Implicit in the term “high-crime area” is a comparison between areas with
differing levels of crime. Presumably there should also be “low-crime areas” and
“medium-crime areas.” However, such designations do not appear in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. As will be discussed later, the need to accurately
determine high-crime areas will necessitate the creation (or recognition) of other
areas with lesser criminal activity.
126. This question is the central focus of this Article.
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In reviewing the cases that have addressed the definitional problem
of a high-crime area, three questions emerge: (1) what type of
evidence should courts require to determine if an area is a highcrime area; (2) what standard of proof should courts adopt to
evaluate that metric of crime; and (3) how should courts cabin the
“area” so designated to make it a meaningful and relevant description
for Fourth Amendment purposes. These three questions of the
method of proof, standard of proof, and geographic and temporal
scope help unravel the question Judge Kozinski posed about how we
establish the characteristics of a high-crime area.
1.

Method of proof
The first issue—highlighted in Wardlow itself—is what proof do we
require for a high-crime area to be considered a high-crime area?
Can a police officer’s subjective belief be sufficient, or should there
be some objective data put into evidence? Appropriately enough, the
Illinois state courts debated the empirical basis of whether Mr.
127
The Illinois Court of
Wardlow was standing in a high-crime area.
Appeals questioned the empirical basis for the assumption, finding
the record vague on the question of whether Wardlow was in an area
128
known for narcotics trafficking.
In contrast, the Illinois Supreme
Court simply accepted the trial court’s finding that the officer’s
129
uncontested testimony established that it was a high-narcotics area.
Similarly, the majority of jurisdictions pre- and post-Wardlow
primarily have relied on an officer’s testimony that an area is a “highcrime area” without much analysis as to the basis of that conclusion.
Some jurisdictions allow inexact reports of arrests to qualify an area
as a “high-crime area,” sometimes as limited as “several [prior] . . .

127. Compare People v. Wardlow (Wardlow II), 701 N.E.2d 484, 486 (Ill. 1998),
rev’d, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (“[W]e believe Officer Nolan’s uncontradicted and
undisputed testimony, which was accepted by the trial court, was sufficient to
establish that the incident occurred in a high-crime area.”), with People v. Wardlow
(Wardlow I), 678 N.E.2d 65, 67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 701 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. 1998),
rev’d, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) ([Officer Nolan’s testimony that] “the area[] . . . had ‘high
narcotics traffic’ . . . indicates only that the officers were headed somewhere in the
general area. There was no evidence that the officers were investigating the specific
area where defendant had been standing or that any of the police cars had stopped
at that location or that defendant had any basis for believing that police were
interested in his activity.”), and id. (“The record here is simply too vague to support
the inference that defendant was in a location with a high incidence of narcotics
trafficking . . . .”).
128. Wardlow I, 678 N.E.2d at 67.
129. Wardlow II, 701 N.E.2d at 486. Of course, absent some heightened standard
of proof (as proposed in this Article), this is the expected legal consequence of
uncontested testimony.
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130

arrests.” Other jurisdictions accept officer opinion testimony that is
based on subjective beliefs or experience that the area is a “high131
crime area” with no corroborating facts. Some jurisdictions require
132
a bit more factual proof, either departmental findings, citizen
133
complaints, or the prior number of arrests that the testifying officer
134
has made. A few courts even have taken judicial notice that an area
135
is a “high-crime area.”
As one might guess, because no court has
130. See United States v. Lovelace, 357 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43 (D.D.C. 2004)
(reasoning that officer making several prior arrests for narcotics coupled with
residents’ complaints of narcotics dealing created a “high-crime area.”); see also
United States v. Pittman, 102 F. App’x 315, 316 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting officer’s
testimony that specific area of arrest was not “high-crime area” but was “across the
street from [a housing complex], where [there were] quite a few shootings and . . .
quite a few homicides”); Burkett v. State, 736 N.E.2d 304, 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
(“From previous arrests [that the officer] had made in the area, [the officer] knew
the neighborhood to have a high incidence of drug trafficking.”); State v. Blackstock,
598 S.E.2d 412, 414 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (“[Unparticularized] statistical data
indicated this area had a problem with robberies and break-in and enterings.”).
131. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 539 N.W.2d 887, 891–92 (Wis. 1995) (“[I]f the state
wants the Court to rely on a high-crime area theory in justifying a Terry pat down,
there has to be a clear and specific record made. I’ve discussed this issue at length
and reviewed the applicable cases and reviewed the problems we will face if we simply
say whenever police are in a high-crime area, they have a right to frisk. Maybe that’s
reasonable in this day and age but if it is going to be done, it’s going to have to be
done with some clear and specific rules which we don’t have right now.” (quoting the
trial court judge)). The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that an “officer’s
perception of an area as ‘high-crime’ can be a factor justifying a search” and rejected
the district court’s call for clarity and specificity in determining what a “high-crime
area” actually is. Id. at 892; see also Riley v. Commonwealth, 412 S.E.2d 724, 726 (Va.
Ct. App. 1992) (noting that officer simply testified that defendant “was in a high
crime area late at night”).
132. See, e.g., State v. Arellano, No. A-04-060, 2004 WL 1151984, at *1 (Neb. Ct.
App. May 25, 2004) (“[The officer] testified [that], based on briefings and
discussions with members of the State Patrol and other law enforcement officers,
[the area was] one where crimes against property and persons frequently take
place.”).
133. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 890 So. 2d 616, 619 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (pointing out
that narcotics division “received frequent complaints about crime in the vicinity of
[arrest]”); Commonwealth v. Blair, 860 A.2d 567, 570 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)
(indicating that arresting officer received numerous complaints about this address in
the past); Commonwealth v. McClease, 750 A.2d 320, 323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)
(noting that officers received generalized complaints about area involving alcohol,
guns, and drugs).
134. See, e.g., People v. Aldridge, 674 P.2d 240, 241 (Cal. 1984) (noting that
arresting officer “had made more than two hundred arrests in the area”); Lee v.
State, 868 So. 2d 577, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that officer “had made
fifteen to twenty drug arrests at that corner”); State v. Scott, 561 So. 2d 170, 172 (La.
Ct. App. 1990) (pointing out that in this particular area, officer “personally made
over forty arrests for drug-related offenses”); Gamble v. State, 8 S.W.3d 452, 453
(Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (“[P]olice had been called either to this area or the residence
about 70 times in a year, including many ‘disturbance calls’ and calls for trespassing,”
[but noting that] “[n]either [arresting] officer had ever arrested anyone there for
drugs or weapons.”).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 994 F.2d 317, 322 n.1 (7th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that trial judge did not improperly take judicial notice that police
encounter occurred in high-crime area); United States v. Four Million, Two
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required a threshold level of arrests or complaints, what is termed a
“high-crime area” can differ from case to case, and jurisdiction to
136
jurisdiction.
Only recently have courts recognized the need for a more
structured method of proof. The Ninth Circuit was one of the first
federal appellate courts to examine the method and mode of proof
for establishing a “high-crime area.” In its first case to address the
137
Wardlow “high-crime area” problem, the court expressed concern
that the “high-crime area” factor was being utilized far too often in
questionable circumstances, and “may well be ‘an invitation to
138
139
trouble,’” which “can easily serve as a proxy for race or ethnicity.”
140
In its analysis in Montero-Camargo, the en banc court held that “more
than mere war stories are required to establish the existence of a
141
high-crime area.”
Instead, the court required that “courts . . .
142
examine with care the specific data underlying any such assertion.”
Montero-Camargo presents an interesting introduction to the
question of the “method of proof” because, while critical of officers
relying on past “war stories” about certain areas, the court did not
rely on much more than these type of war stories to determine that

Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 904 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that court
could properly observe as “common experience consideration” that Miami had
become a center for drug smuggling and money laundering); In re Malone, 592 F.
Supp. 1135, 1144 n.3 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (taking judicial notice that housing project was
high-crime area), aff’d sub nom. Malone v. Fenton, 794 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986); State
v. Burns, 877 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that 6000 block of Field
Street was previously recognized as high-crime area); State v. Vinet, 576 So. 2d 1200,
1200 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (taking judicial notice that area known as “Coke alley” was
known for drugs).
136. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring). In Montero-Camargo, Judge Kozinski compares
the majority’s finding that an average of “[one] arrest every four months” constituted
a “high-crime area,” 208 F.3d at 1143 with United States v. Thornton, 197 F.3d 241, 248
(7th Cir. 1999), which cites officer testimony that there were 2500 narcotics arrests in
five-block-by-five-block area in less than one year, United States v. Morales, 191 F.3d
602, 604 (5th Cir. 1999), which indicates the officer testified that he had detained
600 illegal aliens on same stretch of highway in less than one year, and State v.
Donnell, 239 N.W.2d 575, 576–77 (Iowa 1976), which notes evidence of residential
burglaries numbering “almost in the hundreds” during previous year.
137. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1143 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 1139 n.32 (majority opinion).
139. Id. at 1138.
The Montero-Camargo decision is also notable for its
abandonment of race or ethnicity as one of the permissible factors for a Terry stop.
See Ian H. Hlawati, United States v. Montero-Camargo Elimination of the Race Factor
Develops Piecemeal: The Ninth Circuit Approach, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 703, 729 (2001)
(arguing that despite Montero-Camargo’s rejection of race as a factor in the reasonable
suspicion calculus, police stops based on racial profiling will continue).
140. 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000).
141. Id. at 1139 n.32.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
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the site at issue was a high-crime area. As pointed out in the sharply
worded concurrence authored by Judge Kozinski,
The opinion recognizes the danger in allowing the police to
characterize an area as “high-crime” to establish a basis for
reasonable suspicion, but then proceeds to do just that, based on
nothing more than the personal experiences of two arresting
agents. As I discuss above, the agents didn’t even claim this was a
high crime area, but let’s say they had. What in this record would
support their conclusion? Both agents testified only that they had
detected criminal violations after stopping people in the area. How
often? One agent said he’d been involved in 15–20 stops over eight
and a half years, and “[could]n’t recall any . . . where we didn’t
have a violation of some sort. The other agent testified to “about a
dozen” stops in the same period, all but one of which led to an
arrest.
Without hesitation, the majority treats this as a crime wave, but is
it really? Does an arrest every four months or so make for a high
crime area? . . . Can we rely on the vague and undocumented
recollections of the officers here? Do the two officers’ figures of
“15–20” and “about a dozen” reflect separate pools of incidents, or
do they include some where, as here, both officers were involved?
Are such estimates sufficiently precise to tell us anything useful
about the area? I wouldn’t have thought so, although I could be
persuaded otherwise. But my colleagues don’t even pause to ask
the questions. To them, it’s a high crime area, because the officers
143
say it’s a high crime area.

The questions posed by Judge Kozinski are the central questions
surrounding a coherent “high-crime area” jurisprudence. Logically, a
trial court making a decision about the character of a neighborhood
would need certain baseline facts. What do those numbers mean in
terms of total arrest numbers? Clearly, an area with an average of “an
arrest every four months” sounds unlike a high-crime area that would
warrant a change in Fourth Amendment analysis. However, without a
baseline comparison, the courts and the litigants are simply guessing
at the import of the numbers. What if there were an area with four
arrests a day, or fourteen arrests a day? Could they all be considered
“high-crime areas” if the officer said so, or should there be an
objective measuring of the level of relative crime? Additionally, as
can be seen in the vagueness of the numbers (“about a dozen”), even
the testifying officer is not basing his testimony on a documented

143. Id. at 1143 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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record, making cross-examination and verification difficult. Again as
Judge Kozinski recognized:
Just as a man with a hammer sees every problem as a nail, so a
man with a badge may see every corner of his beat as a high crime
area . . . . Police are trained to detect criminal activity and they look
at the world with suspicious eyes. This is a good thing, because we
rely on this suspicion to keep us safe from those who would harm
us. But to rely on every cop’s repertoire of war stories to determine
what is a “high-crime area”—and on that basis to treat otherwise
innocuous behavior as grounds for reasonable suspicion—strikes
me as an invitation to trouble. If the testimony of two officers that
they made, at most, 32 arrests during the course of a decade is
sufficient to turn the road here into a high crime area, then what
area under police surveillance wouldn’t qualify as one? There are
street corners in our inner cities that see as much crime within a
month—even a week. I would be most reluctant to give police the
power to turn any area into a high crime area based on their
144
unadorned personal experiences.

Built within the Montero-Camargo decision is a tension about the
requisite method of proof. While seeking empirical data, the court
fails to analyze how the lower courts should evaluate that data. The
question is raised but resolved without a satisfactory answer.
This question of the appropriate method of proof was also
considered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
145
Circuit in United States v. Bonner. In Bonner, the court of appeals was
faced with a developed factual record in which the question of the
crime rate of the neighborhood was litigated in the district court.
The district court found that the contested Fourth Amendment stop
did not take place in a “high narcotics trafficking area” as the
146
prosecution contended.
At the suppression hearing, the
prosecution presented evidence indicating that an average of 1.3
arrests were made per week near the place of the stop and that the
147
majority of these were for misdemeanor or summary offenses.
In
addition, the prosecution also submitted a news article which
148
characterized the housing project at issue as a “high-crime area.”
Despite this offer of proof, the district court found that given the
large amount of people who live in the housing project, the area was
149
Additionally, the district court noted that the
not high in crime.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
363 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 216.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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arrests were not largely for narcotics violations as was alleged in the
indictment, and therefore, even if the arrest rate constituted a “highcrime area,” the nature of the offenses were not consistent with
150
narcotics trafficking.
The Third Circuit reversed the district court on other grounds, but
found the “high-crime area” determination was not clearly
151
erroneous.
Of note, Judge Smith specifically raised the issue of
what method of proof and standard of proof should be required to
determine the character of the area:
I write separately only to highlight an issue implicated in the
District Court’s fact-finding which we have not been required to
address: whether under the flight “plus” analysis of Wardlow . . . the
government is required to prove the existence of objective criteria
for what constitutes a high crime area and that the stop occurred in
such an area, or rather that the government is required to prove
that officers effecting the stop had a reasonable articulable basis to
152
believe that they were in a “high-crime area.”

The issue to Judge Smith was precisely what information should be
required for the government to prove a high-crime area. While the
court expressly declined to decide the issue, it raised the concern
about the problem of objective criteria, including the reality of
153
Again,
incomplete crime reports or unreported reports of crime.
like the Ninth Circuit, the question about the method of proof was
raised, but deferred to another day.
A recent case from the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit provides another revealing example in the struggle to define
154
the mode of proof for high-crime areas. In United States v. Wright,
the First Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to
reconsider its high-crime area finding. In doing so, it laid out a
155
three-part framework for analyzing the issue.
In Wright, the court was presented with a similar factual situation to
the Wardlow case. Specifically, a caravan of police officers in
unmarked cars pulled up next to the car in which defendant Wright
156
was a passenger. Upon seeing the police officers, Wright exited the
150. Id.
151. Id. at 215–16.
152. Id. at 218 (Smith, J., concurring).
153. See id. at 219 (“[A]n officer is in the position to know the routines and
patterns of a geographic area, and whether it is more prone to crime. This
knowledge may not be reflected on arrest records and log sheets, as arrests are not
the only indicia of crime. In any case, we need not resolve the issue here.”).
154. 485 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2007).
155. Id. at 53–54.
156. Id. at 47.
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157

The police officers gave chase, stopped Wright
car and ran away.
158
Wright was
and then upon searching him, recovered a gun.
159
arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Wright moved
to suppress the gun on the ground that the search violated the
Fourth Amendment.
During the suppression hearing, the character of the area in which
the stop occurred became a major point of dispute. For the
prosecution, the three officers testified that the area is “a very high
crime area consisting of firearm violence, drug activity, street
160
robberies, breaking and enterings, all type of street crimes.”
Officers based their testimony on their own experiences and arrests
in the area. However, also during the government’s presentation of
evidence, the testifying officers referred to biweekly reports kept by
the Boston Police Department containing detailed statistics about
161
crimes in the area. In those reports, the Boston Police Department
designated certain areas as “hot spots” known for their higher
162
incidence of criminal activity.
The defense introduced those
reports to show that the area in which Wright was arrested was not a
hot spot, and thus, not a high-crime area as defined by the Boston
Police Department’s own system. The trial court admitted its candid
confusion about whether the area was a high-crime area. However,
the court credited the fact that since there was a functioning official
mapping system that mapped criminal incidents, and the area at issue
was not in those designated hot spots, the government had not
demonstrated that the particular area in question was a high-crime
163
area.
On appeal, the First Circuit responded to the trial court’s findings
by providing an analytical framework to determine high-crime areas.
The court acknowledged that the question of whether an area is a
high-crime area is a “factual issue” to be determined by the trial
164
court. While the appellate court did not express an opinion about
the trial court’s reliance on the Boston Police Department’s reports,
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 49.
161. See id. (“Officer Bordley explained how he, and other members of the Youth
Violence Task Force, determine whether a particular area is a high crime area:
‘There are weekly and biweekly reports that are done. They keep stats on what’s
happening in the city, and they have a meeting every two weeks and they report
those stats in the meeting.’”).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 49–50.
164. See id. at 53 (“We see no reason to treat the character of the stop’s location as
other than a factual issue.”).
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it did set forth an analysis that validates the trial court’s finding.
Specifically, the court recognized that a high-crime area must be
determined by looking at the connection between the crime at issue
and the crime the area is known for, the geographic boundaries of
the area in question, and the temporal proximity between the
evidence of higher criminal activity and what was seen by the
165
On remand, the district court was, thus, instructed to
officer.
analyze the proffered contested evidence of the area through this
166
framework.
Disagreement about what constitutes a “high-crime area” is not
167
limited to federal courts. For example, in State v. Morgan, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court grappled with the issue and ended up with
168
yet a different answer. In Morgan, the district court found a lack of
a “clear and specific record” to support the officer’s testimony that
169
On appeal, the Wisconsin
the area was a “high-crime area.”
Supreme Court overruled the district court on the issue of what
constitutes a “high-crime area.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that deference should be given to officers, and that “an officer’s
perception of an area as ‘high-crime’ can be a factor justifying a
170
search.”
The court held that the officer’s testimony was sufficient
to establish a “high-crime area,” and that the officer need not cite
171
crime reports or statistics to validate his belief.
The dissent in
Morgan highlighted its concern with this undefined proffer,
suggesting several ways to firm up otherwise malleable perception of
the area. First, the officer should “state the basis for his portrayal of
172
the area,” and “define the geographic locality about which he was
173
speaking.” The dissent continued by suggesting that “[s]ome effort
165. Id. at 53–54.
166. See id. at 54 (“Given the significance of location in evaluating the totality of
the circumstances . . . and in light of the considerations set forth herein, the district
court, upon remand, may wish to reevaluate the high crime area issue. However, we
wish to be clear that we are not directing the district court to reconsider its high
crime area finding, and we are not suggesting what that finding should be, if it
chooses to revisit the issue.”).
167. 539 N.W.2d 887 (Wis. 1995).
168. Id.
169. See id. at 891 (recognizing the lower court’s finding that “if the state wants the
Court to rely on a high-crime area theory in justifying a Terry pat down, there has to
be a clear and specific record made”).
170. Id. at 892.
171. See id. at 895 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (expressing concern with
majority’s reliance on officer’s testimony that area was “a high crime area, or what I
would consider [a] high crime area”).
172. See id. (“Unspecific assertions that there is a crime problem in a particular
area should be given little weight . . . .” (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 9.3(c), at 457 (2d ed. 1987)).
173. Morgan, 539 N.W.2d at 895 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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must be made to correlate the specific type of crime allegedly
endemic to a particular area with the police officer’s reasonable
174
This concern is similar to the First Circuit’s opinion
suspicion.”
and will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
The conclusion of this brief overview is that courts are struggling
with a method of proof to determine what constitutes a high-crime
area. While perception and police officer opinion can be useful, they
may not be accurate or verifiable. Courts are, thus, debating the
merits of a more empirical and statistical approach. As will be
discussed in Part III, this shift may well be the most practical method
of creating a useable definition of a high-crime area.
2.

Standard of proof
Whether courts rely on officer war stories or official police
department statistical reports, having a method of proof is only the
first step. Courts must also have a standard by which to evaluate that
proffer of evidence. In many Fourth Amendment situations, the
question of the standard of proof is rolled up in the larger Fourth
175
In
Amendment standard of a “preponderance of the evidence.”
Wardlow, however, the Supreme Court recognized that a reasonable
176
suspicion analysis likely rests on a lesser legal standard.
What
exactly that lesser standard should look like in the context of a highcrime area has not been settled by the few courts addressing this
issue.
In Bonner, the federal district court applied a “preponderance
standard,” determining that the government failed to show by a
preponderance of evidence that the area in question was a high-drug
177
area. There was no discussion of why the preponderance standard
was chosen, except it can be inferred that it comports with other
178
Fourth Amendment requirements. In addition, the preponderance

174. Id.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 400 F. Supp. 2d 673, 680 (D. Del. 2005)
(“Considering the totality of this record against the preponderance of the evidence
standard, the court finds plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendant’s behavior
gave rise to reasonable suspicion and, as a result, the stop and frisk violated the
Fourth Amendment.”).
176. See Illinois v. Wardlow (Wardlow III), 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (“While
‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth
Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification . . . .”).
177. United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2004) (Smith, J.,
concurring).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974) (noting that
controlling burden of proof in suppression hearings is proof by preponderance of
the evidence); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) (holding that the

1616

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1587

standard has the advantage of simplicity. For a preponderance
standard to be applied, the court must find that the area is more
179
However, as will be discussed
likely than not a high-crime area.
below, the preponderance standard may not be the only standard
available.
The concurring opinion in Bonner specifically addressed the
standard of proof and the district court’s choice of a preponderance
of evidence standard. As mentioned, Judge Smith proposed a more
lenient standard, requiring the government to “prove that [the]
officers effecting the stop had a reasonable articulable basis to believe that
180
they were in a ‘high crime area.’”
Judge Smith essentially created a
reasonable suspicion test for high-crime areas (within the larger
181
reasonable suspicion analysis for a Terry stop).
As justification for
the more lenient standard, Judge Smith reasoned that officers “may
be informed by various objective observations, information from
police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes
182
As a
or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers.”
result, “an officer is in the position to know the routines and patterns
183
of a geographic area, and whether it is prone to crime.”
Judge
Smith noted that “reviewing court[s] must give the appropriate
184
weight to factual inferences drawn by local law enforcement officers,”
and rejected the notion that the government should have to provide
185
hard data on crime statistics.
Judge Smith’s standard would allow a high-crime area to be
designated by the reasonable suspicion of officers thinking they were
in a high-crime area. In practical terms, this would mean that officers
could explain why they believed the area to be a high-crime area, and
Constitution requires the prosecution to prove that a confession was voluntary by a
preponderance of the evidence);.
179. When presented with factual data or statistics to compare, such a comparison
could be made with minimal difficulty.
180. Bonner, 363 F.3d at 218 (Smith, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
181. Presumably, this means that if officers have a reasonable suspicion that they
are in a high-crime area, then they can use that reasonable suspicion to justify their
reasonable suspicion of the actions of the suspect. Upon analysis, one wonders
whether this standard improves anything at all. Certainly, it does not alter the status
quo reality of having officers merely testify that they believed they were in a highcrime area without any empirical, verifiable data. It would also require a reevaluation of Bonner despite the district court’s findings because the officers clearly
believed they were in a high-crime area.
182. Bonner, 363 F.3d at 219 (Smith, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
183. Id.
184. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996)).
185. See id. (“This knowledge [of crime data and statistics] may not be reflected on
arrest records and log sheets, as arrests are not the only indicia of crime.”).
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as long as their belief was based on some articulated factors, it would
186
suffice for Fourth Amendment purposes.
In dissent, Judge McKee argued for yet another mode of proof
lying between the higher preponderance of the evidence standard
and the lower reasonable articulable basis standard set forth by Judge
Smith. Judge McKee reasoned that “the inquiry must be the subjective
187
belief of the arresting officer” which “must be objectively reasonable.” Judge
McKee buttressed this objectively reasonable standard by noting that
“[a]lthough proper deference must be afforded to the training,
experience, and knowledge of police officers . . . the Constitution
does not allow us to abdicate our responsibilities in favor of their
judgments simply because we are operating within the comfortable
188
Judge McKee rationalized the lesser
confines of a courtroom.”
standard because “reasonable suspicion can be established with
information that is different in quantity or content than that required
189
to establish probable cause” and because “reasonable suspicion can
arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show
190
probable cause.”
Judge McKee’s standard would require a court to find a high-crime
area based on the objectively reasonable, subjective belief of the
officer. Essentially, this would mean that an officer could testify to his
subjective belief about an area with some minimal requirement that
that belief be grounded in objective facts. This raises the bar a bit
from Judge Smith’s subjective approach, but still relies on the
subjective beliefs of the officer.
Importantly, however, it creates a rebuttable presumption of sorts
that could be overcome by objective facts that show the officer’s
belief was unreasonable. Such a presumption leaves open the
opportunity for a defendant to rebut the claim with crime data
statistics or other data (as was successfully done in Bonner). Judge
McKee’s standard allows for the use of verifiable data, but does not
require it in the government’s case. It provides a compromise,
recognizing that not all high crime areas can be determined by
186. The difficulty with this standard, as will be discussed infra, is that it is not
much different from the existing reality and does little to clarify or refine the
analysis. It also shifts the determination of a legal fact—that an area was a high-crime
area—into the hands of the officer and not the trial court.
187. Bonner, 363 F.3d at 222 n.5 (McKee, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 221 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).
190. Id. Judge McKee’s requirement that the officer’s subjective belief be
objectively reasonable would allow a rebuttable presumption, which may, at least
theoretically, be overcome by objective facts which show that the officer’s belief was
unreasonable.
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objective data, but also opens the door for use of that data when
requested by either party.
In parsing out the different standards addressed by the district and
appellate courts in Bonner, there are three apparent options (in
descending order of required proof): (1) the preponderance of
evidence standard (the Bonner district court standard); (2) the
subjective belief that must be objectively reasonable (the McKee
standard); and (3) the reasonable articulable basis standard (the
Smith standard). No other federal court has apparently attempted a
similar analysis, but the question of what standard of proof should be
applied is raised every day in reasonable suspicion determinations.
As will be discussed in Part III, if an empirically driven analysis of
high-crime area is to be undertaken, the existing undefined standards
may not be sufficient.
3.

Scope of designation
Inherent in the definition of a high-crime area is a geographical
and temporal limitation to that area. What are the geographic
boundaries? Do they shift over time? Can an area change from
being a high-crime area to a non-high crime area over time, and how
do we know when that has happened? Courts have labeled certain
191
and
streets, housing complexes, neighborhoods, intersections,
whole undefined areas with a high-crime gloss without ever giving
192
precise information about the contours of the designation.
Two cases out of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
demonstrate the problems of undefined geographical or temporal
boundaries.
Unlike many larger jurisdictions, the District of
Columbia offers a geographically discrete area of analysis. Compared
to the variations of potential “high crime” neighborhoods
throughout Wardlow’s Illinois, for example, from cornfields to innercity Chicago, the District of Columbia presents a microcosm of
differing socioeconomic areas in a rather limited space. A particular
“high-crime area” may well be confined to a few blocks within
neighborhoods. Further, with the rapid gentrification of certain
neighborhoods, areas once designated high-crime areas may well, a
decade later, be home to million-dollar condominiums and relatively

191. See, e.g., United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2006)
(agreeing that intersection in question was “high-crime area” because the crime
defendant was stopped for frequently occurred there).
192. See infra notes 196–207 and accompanying text (criticizing a court’s
designation of a street as a “high-crime area” when it is almost five miles long).
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193

It is in this limited geographic area, that the
crime-free streets.
194
strength and weakness of the high-crime designation can be
195
analyzed.
196
First, in James v. United States, a District of Columbia Metropolitan
Police Officer pulled over a car that had just swerved near the
197
The stop occurred on a street described by the
officer’s cruiser.
testifying officer as “high crime, violent crime, it’s high narcotics, it’s
198
high everything—burglaries, robberies.”
When the officer
approached the car, the driver looked at the officer and “kind of
raised his body up a little bit, and then bent all the way down . . . and
199
then he sat back up.” This led the officer to believe that the driver
200
was “pulling a gun from his waist and putting it under the seat.” A
search incident to the stop resulted in the recovery of a gun, and
201
James was charged with a series of gun offenses.
James moved to

193. See generally MAUREEN KENNEDY & PAUL LEONARD, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION, DEALING WITH NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: A PRIMER ON GENTRIFICATION
AND POLICY CHOICES 54–59 (2001) (describing the partial gentrification of several
Washington, D.C. neighborhoods), available at http://brookings.edu/reports/2001/
04metropolitanpolicy.aspx.
194. Perhaps because of the shaky neighborhood demarcations, pre-Wardlow cases
in the District of Columbia viewed the “high-crime area” factor with a certain
measure of skepticism. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals required
specificity in delineating what was and was not a “high-crime area” and when it was
appropriate to consider such a designation. For example, in the first case to address
the weight to give a high crime area, the term had little impact. In Kenion v. United
States, the appellant—whom the officer believed had a prior robbery conviction—was
stopped after he was seen conversing with two other men, in inclement weather, in
an area described as “the heart and center for vice activity within [the third] district.”
302 A.2d 723, 724 (D.C. 1973). After the court of appeals dismissed the weather
factor as being irrelevant, it concluded that “that fact [high crime area], without a
great deal more, would not support an inference that appellant was engaged in
criminal conduct.” Id. at 725; see also In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138, 143 (D.C. 1987)
(rejecting the notion that because the stop had taken place in “high narcotics area,”
appellant’s conduct warranted heightened police attention, noting that “[t]housands
of persons live and go about their legitimate business in areas which are denoted
‘high narcotics areas’ by police,” and that “[i]nnocent activities do not become
sinister by the mere fact that they take place in one of these areas”); Curtis v. United
States, 349 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C. 1975) (“[W]e eschew the notion that the above facts
assume added significance because they happen to have occurred in a high crime
area. This familiar talismanic litany, without a great deal more, cannot support an
inference that appellant was engaged in criminal conduct.”).
195. As will be discussed in Part III, the District of Columbia crime patterns and
crime statistics provide a workable metric to analyze the importance of getting the
designation correct.
196. 829 A.2d 963 (D.C. 2003).
197. Id. at 964.
198. See id. (“[Officer] Green testified that he had been a police officer for five
years and had worked in the Fourth District, where these events took place, for four
of those years.”).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 964.
201. Id. at 964–65.
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202

suppress the gun and lost at the trial level. On appeal, after noting
that the “high-crime area” factor is “certainly relevant,” the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals stated that “[t]hat is especially true in this
case, given that the area where appellant was stopped was not just a
‘high crime’ area, but an area known specifically for the type of
activity—i.e., gun possession—of which [the officer] suspected
203
appellant.” The court appeared to give controlling emphasis to the
“high-crime area” factor in upholding the trial court’s ruling.
James is instructive for two reasons. First, the area described as a
“high everything” area is, in fact, one of the major north-south
204
The language
thoroughfares in Washington, D.C., Northwest.
chosen by the officer, that “the Georgia Avenue corridor” was a highcrime area means that a stretch of road almost five miles long was
such an area. In a city that is only about ten miles long north-south,
this is an expansive and apparently unchallenged assertion. In
addition, the area in which the stop occurred was right by a major
205
university and hospital complex.
Second, the court inverted the
nexus argument by allowing the officer’s scattershot suspicions to
206
justify whatever was found. Clearly, if it is a high “everything” area,
whatever is found would fall under the officer’s suspicions. The
testifying officer did not single out gun possession as what the area
207
was known for, but rather that the area was known for all crimes.
One can imagine the court could have applied the same logic to
drugs or other contraband if it had been found under the seat.
208
As another example, Mayes v. United States highlights the difficulty
209
of rebutting a claim that an area is no longer a “high-crime area.”
In Mayes, the officers had approached a stopped car in front of a
210
“notorious crack house”
which they believed matched the
211
At the
description of a car used in a shooting the previous night.

202. Id. at 964.
203. Id. at 968.
204. See, e.g., Nikita Stewart, Georgia Ave. Awakening, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2007, at
A1 (referring to Georgia Avenue as Washington’s “longest commercial corridor” and
the “heart and soul of the city”).
205. Whether there are spots along Georgia Avenue that are high crime areas may
be accurate, but to claim that the entire road—half the city—is such an area paints
with too broad a brush.
206. James, 829 A.2d at 864.
207. Id.
208. 653 A.2d 856 (D.C. 1995).
209. See infra notes 213–219 and accompanying text (showing how a court may
designate an area as high-crime despite strong evidence to the contrary).
210. Mayes, 653 A.2d at 859.
211. Id. at 858; see also id. at 863–64 (asserting that officers’ reliance on report was
insufficient to establish “articulable suspicion,” at least in part because—as the
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motions hearing, the government offered evidence that the block on
which the stop occurred was in a “high-crime area,” generally, and
that the house in which the defendants were parked in front of was,
212
This evidence was
in particular, a “notorious crack house.”
rebutted by a defense investigator, who testified that “the building
was in fact a high-rent luxury apartment house with its own security
213
The defense
fence,” which housed mostly “professional people.”
also submitted photographs of the luxury apartment house, a
brochure about the building, and also testimony that “the premises
214
and grounds were well maintained.” A defense investigator further
testified that according to the building manager, there had been “no
crime problems at the complex in the past four years” aside from
215
While the trial court rejected the
“maybe a domestic situation.”
officer’s claim that the house was a “notorious crack house,” it still
“credited the testimony that the general area was a high crime
216
In fact, the appellate court held that “the trial court was
area.”
required, and so are we, to include in the [reasonable suspicion]
217
calculus . . . the character of the neighborhood.”
The issue of over-inclusive high-crime areas is not limited to
Washington, D.C. In many East Coast cities such as New York City,
Boston, New Haven, and Philadelphia, economic change has
218
reshaped former high-crime boundaries over the past decades. Yet,
219
a Westlaw or Lexis search for the term in the relevant jurisdiction
will reveal historical judicial findings of high-crime areas fixed in the
case law. Litigants, thus, might be tempted to use these judicial
findings in court even when the reality on the streets has changed.
These questions of geographical and temporal relevance are
manifest in the analysis of some courts trying to find a limit to the
high-crime designation. For example, the Ninth Circuit’s majority
opinion in Montero-Camargo held that the data should identify
government admitted— “[t]here was no evidence to speak of regarding the source’s
basis of knowledge or reliability”).
212. Id. at 859.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 860.
217. Id. at 864. The Court in Mayes rejected the trial court’s reasoning on other
grounds.
218. See, e.g., Joanna Smith Rakoff, Is New York Losing Its Street Smarts?, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 2004, § 14, at 1 (crediting the drop in New York City crime rates, at least in
part, to gentrification and the clean-up of the city), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/24/nyregion/24smar.html?scp=10&sq=gentrifica
tion+crime+&st=nyt.
219. See www.westlaw.com & www.lexis.com (keyword search “high crime area” /s
“fourth amendment”).
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“specific, circumscribed locations where particular crimes occur with
220
unusual regularity” so as not to include “entire neighborhoods or
communities in which members of minority groups regularly go
221
about their daily business.”
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit once even limited the designation to a particular intersection,
222
Because the suspicion was
so as not to create an overbroad area.
tailored to “a specific intersection rather than an entire
223
neighborhood,” the court found the area narrowly tailored enough
224
to survive scrutiny.
The First Circuit in Wright provides the clearest recognition of the
concern of an overbroad designation. Faced with an area that was
not within Boston’s designated hotspots, but was apparently thought
by the testifying officers to be a high-crime area, the First Circuit set
out a three-part analysis to ensure that the designation of an area is
225
closely correlated with the proof. In Wright, as discussed above, the
court laid out three categories of relevant evidence for this
determination: (1) “the nexus between the type of crime most
prevalent or common in the area and the type of crime suspected in
the instant case”; (2) the “limited geographic boundaries of the ‘area’
or ‘neighborhood’ being evaluated”; and (3) the “temporal proximity
between evidence of heightened criminal activity and the date of the
226
stop or search at issue.”
In setting out this framework, the First
Circuit provides the first usable test for courts seeking to focus on the
issues of cabining a particular geographic and temporal location. It is
also a useful starting point to create an objective, verifiable definition
of a high-crime area. This will be the subject of the next section.
III. EMPIRICAL AND VERIFIABLE EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE
HIGH-CRIME AREAS
The struggle to define and make meaningful a “high-crime area”
designation has two root causes. First, the Supreme Court left the
question open in Wardlow, basing its holding on an assumed but

220. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000).
221. Id.
222. See United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that
appellant conceded that particular intersection at issue was “high crime area where
officers expect nightly calls regarding robberies or shots fired”).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2007).
226. See id. (establishing a framework for objectively identifying specific area as
“high crime” instead of relying solely on potentially self-serving police testimony).
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227

Second, it is simply easier for district
undefined factual issue.
courts and prosecutors to rely on subjective opinions of police
officers rather than to obtain hard, verifiable data. This Part argues
that the status quo is unacceptable for Fourth Amendment purposes,
and that if the “high-crime area” designation is going to be used to
alter constitutional protections, it must have basis in objective
statistical fact.
A. The Constitutional Issue
This Article proposes creating an affirmative burden of production
for the government to prove that an area is a high-crime area. In
creating an additional burden, it is necessary to justify why such a
burden is required and also why the existing legal practice is
incomplete.
To do so, one must understand the constitutional principles at play
in the current Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion calculus.
228
Briefly, altering Fourth Amendment protections for individuals in
certain sections of a city has real consequences for individual
229
liberty. The legal determination that men like Sam Wardlow have
lesser Fourth Amendment protections simply because of the
neighborhood in which they find themselves is fraught with
230
Even ignoring the economic, racial, and social
concern.
inequalities involved, one must hope that police officers are at least
correct that it is a high-crime area, and are not using their suspicions
of the neighborhood as a proxy for impermissible hunches. The line
between constitutional “reasonable suspicion” and unconstitutional
231
hunches is a difficult one to draw.
Using neighborhoods as a
means to blur that line must be carefully monitored.

227. See supra Part I.B (discussing how the Wardlow Court treated District 11 as a
high-crime area without elaborating on the meaning of that phrase).
228. Again, there has been significant scholarly analysis of the liberty interests
involved in the use of high-crime areas. See supra notes 19–23 (surveying law review
articles criticizing the high-crime area designation on racial, class, and First
Amendment grounds).
229. The Fourth Amendment was enacted to protect individual liberty from
overreaching government officials. See, e.g., Ronner, supra note 19, at 397–98
(explaining that agents of English parliament had an unrestricted right to search
and seize, much to the dismay of the American colonists).
230. E.g., Seawell, supra note 21, at 1131 (arguing that the high-crime area
designation leads to diminished expectations of privacy for some citizens and
perpetuates the politics of identification).
231. Cf. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000)
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (discussing the difficulty in applying totality of the
circumstance test because the police officers discover whether their conduct was
permissible only at trial).
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In addition, because the current practice allows police officers to
make assertions of the high-crime nature of the area without
verifiable evidence, it allows the police to shape Fourth Amendment
protections of its citizens. Whether an area is a high-crime area is a
legal (constitutional) fact. It is an objective definition to be
232
determined by the trial court, not the police officer. Yet, in relying
on the testifying officer for the opinion about an area, courts are
shifting the responsibility to police to make what is a legal conclusion.
Officers acting in good faith about their experiences may be
unintentionally shaping the constitutional protections of the citizens
in the communities. As Judge Kozinski recognized, we expect police
officers to consider their beats a high-crime area because they are
233
looking for—or responding to—reports of crime every day.
However, the fact that an individual officer sees crimes every day does
not mean that these areas should necessarily be areas of lesser Fourth
Amendment protection. The Fourth Amendment is in part meant to
act as a check on the interests of officers “engaged in the often
234
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”
Thus, the additional burden of production to prove that an area is
a high-crime area merely counteracts the weighty liberty interests at
issue. If the fact is going to change the scope of constitutional
protections, then it had better be an accurate, provable, and courtdetermined constitutional fact. Interestingly, this is the position law
enforcement took in the Wardlow case. In its amicus brief before the
Supreme Court, NAPO invited the Court to adopt an empirical test
235
for high-crime areas.
B. The NAPO Amicus Brief
Far from running away from objective requirements, the Wardlow
NAPO amicus brief argued that an area with a reputation for high

232. See id. at 1138 (majority opinion) (emphasizing that designation of “highcrime area” necessitates a “careful examination by the court”).
233. See id. at 1143 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (insisting that the testimony of police
officers as to whether an area is “high crime” is not enough to designate it as such
based solely on “unadorned personal experiences”).
234. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (“The point of the
Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it
denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men
draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”).
235. See NAPO Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 7–8 (suggesting that empirical data
would rebut arguments that police artificially create “high-crime areas” by targeting
neighborhoods with high concentrations of racial or ethnic minorities).
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crime can be demonstrated by “verifiable and quantifiable data.”
The argument continued that “[s]ophisticated data collection,
geographical computer and other mapping, and detailed
geographical analysis systems have all become an essential part of
237
More specifically, the NAPO brief recognized
crime prevention.”
that advancements in technology and computer mapping were
238
providing geographical data useful in crime prevention. Reviewing
this data in the context of Wardlow, NAPO stated:
Determining which locales or neighborhoods are high crime
areas, and knowing what types of crimes are prevalent in those
areas, results in a more efficient allocation of resources and thus
more effective law enforcement, as was occurring in this case.
Chicago Police District 11, where the Respondent fled from the
police, is such a high crime area. In 1997, District 11 had a higher
overall total crime rate than 13 of the 25 police districts, roughly an
equal crime rate to two of the districts, and a lower crime rate than
9 of the districts. When broken down further, this data reveals that
in 1997, District 11 had the highest number of murders and
robberies, and the second highest number of criminal sexual
assaults and aggravated assaults, of all the police districts in
Chicago. This data clearly indicates that District 11 is a high crime
239
area . . . .

The NAPO brief concluded that this “quantification” of reports of
crime prevents an arbitrary or unequal application of the high-crime
240
area term.
The NAPO brief is revealing for two contradictory reasons. First, it
shows the limitations of data analysis in the high-crime area
241
context.
Second, it shows that despite those limitations law
enforcement has faith in its ability to determine through objective
statistical data the existence of high-crime areas.

236. Id. at 7.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 20–21 (“The use of geographical factors in policing is the subject of
extensive ongoing studies. In conducting these studies, researchers rely on
computer mapping as a fundamental tool when working with geographical data.
Aided by advancements in technology, computer mapping, which can encompass the
production of a simple pin map or the complex interactive mapping for detailed
geographical analysis, has become an essential part of crime prevention in larger
cities.”) (footnotes omitted).
239. Id. at 7.
240. See id. at 20 (“‘[H]igh crime areas’ are not determined in an arbitrary and
capricious manner, but are so defined based on verifiable quantitative and qualitative
factors, as well as strong anecdotal evidence.”).
241. See text accompanying notes 242–246 (suggesting that, relative to the other
districts in Chicago, District 11 may not actually be a “high-crime area”).
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As an initial matter, there are a few questions left open by the
242
NAPO conclusion that District 11 is “clearly” a high-crime area.
First, District 11 appears to rank right in the middle of the districts in
243
Chicago in terms of crime.
Apparently, there are nine “higher”
244
From the
high-crime Districts, and two that tie with District 11.
NAPO’s own analysis there are then at least twelve high-crime districts
245
making half of Chicago’s districts “high-crime areas.” Further, the
NAPO brief makes no distinction within districts, as if there were not
particular areas or blocks that might exist as more particular problem
246
Finally, as is confounding in a case in which the
locations.
proffered reasonable suspicion was that Mr. Wardlow was standing in
247
a high-narcotics area, there are no drug statistics. Why a prevalence
for robbery or murder is indicative of narcotics possession is not
immediately obvious. Thus, while the NAPO clearly seeks to rely on
data for high-crime areas, the conclusions drawn from that data
248
require more sustained scrutiny.
However, while the conclusions of that data are debatable, law
enforcement’s embrace of objective crime statistics puts into question
why courts would rely on anything else in Fourth Amendment
hearings. After all, if police have the data available, why would it not
be put into evidence as a matter of course in suppression hearings?
The NAPO brief essentially invites the Supreme Court to adopt an
objective standard for high-crime areas, because the police can
249
provide the required information.
This practical faith in data
militates toward legal acceptance. As demonstrated in the statistics
provided in the amicus brief, the data already exists and is being used
250
for staffing and resource allocation decisions in our communities.
It, therefore, also can be used to create accurate assessments in court.
242. NAPO Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 7.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See id. at 25 n.27 (disclosing that drug statistics were not included in the
data).
248. However, even if the conclusion that District 11 is a “high-crime area” is
contestable, the fact that it can be contested proves the larger point—namely, that
objective statistics should be the determining fact in creating or defining high-crime
areas.
249. See NAPO Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 6–8 (arguing that crime statistics
would allay fears that police officers are creating “high-crime areas” through
subjective experience).
250. See id. at 21–22 (asserting that San Diego, CA; Dallas, TX; Baltimore, MD; and
Tempe, AZ have all implemented various methods of crime mapping); see also infra
note 251 (providing websites for other cities that have implemented methods of
crime mapping).
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Of course, as also detailed above, this data must be looked at with a
critical eye before it is allowed to pass constitutional muster in Fourth
Amendment hearings.
Importantly, since Wardlow was decided in 2000, this ability to
determine a high-crime area has only increased. The prevalence of
crime mapping software and crime pattern analysis has increased in
sophistication and detail.
For example, in over two dozen
jurisdictions there exist high-quality mapping technologies that are
251
publicly available on the Internet. In addition, the Department of
251. See, e.g., Albuquerque Crime Statistics, http://www.cabq.gov/onlinesvcs/
crimestats/index.html (last visited June 10, 2008); Anchorage Police Department
Density Map Archives, http://www.muni.org/apd1/densityarchives.cfm (last visited
June 10, 2008); Atlanta Police Department Online Crime Mapping,
http://www.atlantapd.org/index.asp?nav=CrimeMapping (last visited June 10, 2008);
Austin Police Department Crime Report Viewer, http://coagis1.ci.austin.tx.us/
website/CrimeViewer/Run.htm (last visited June 10, 2008); Baltimore County
Community Crime Profile Main Page, http://www.baltimorecountymd.gov/Agencies
/infotech/geographic_information_systems/interactive_maps/ccpMain.html
(last
visited June 10, 2008); Baltimore Police Department, http://141.157.54.34/
bpdmaps/police.htm (last visited June 10, 2008); Boulder Crime Map,
http://www.bouldercolorado.gov/files/Police/crime_map101207.swf (last visited
June 10, 2008); Charlotte Community Crime Information System,
http://maps.cmpdweb.org/cmpdnet/map.aspx (last visited June 10, 2008); Chicago
Police Department Clear Map, http://gis.chicagopolice.org/ (last visited June 10,
2008); City of Chico Crime Maps, http://www.chico.ca.us/Police/Crime_Analysis/
Crime_Maps.asp (last visited June 10, 2008); City of Lincoln Interactive Crime Map,
http://www.lincoln.ne.gov/main/s_map.htm (last visited June 10, 2008); City of New
Orleans Police Department, http://www.cityofno.com/Portals/Portal50/portal.aspx
(last visited June 10, 2008); City of Reno Crime Reports, http://maps.cityofreno.net/
(last visited June 10, 2008); City of Sacramento Police Department Crime Mapping,
http://gis.cityofsacramento.org/website/sacpd/ (last visited June 10, 2008); Denver
Public
Safety
Reports,
http://www.denvergov.org/DenverMaps/report.asp?
rpt=csafe&cat=csafe (last visited June 10, 2008); Greenville County Incident Mapping
System, http://www.gcgis.org/webmapso/ (last visited June 10, 2008); Indianapolis
Law Enforcement Map Viewer, http://imaps.indygov.org/cvc/ (last visited June 10,
2008); Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Crime Mapping Web Site,
http://www.lvmpd.com/crimeviewcommunity/ (last visited June 10, 2008);
Lexington Citizen’s Crime Watch, http://crimewatch.lfucg.com/ (last visited June
10,
2008);
Los
Angeles
Police
Department
Crime
Maps,
http://www.lapdonline.org/crimemap/ (last visited June 10, 2008); Memphis
CrimeMapper, https://crimemapper.memphispolice.org/crimemapper/index.cfm
(last visited June 10, 2008); Nashville Police Department Interactive Crime Maps,
http://pdmap2.police.nashville.org/ (last visited June 10, 2008); Philadelphia
CrimeBase Maps, http://www.cml.upenn.edu/crimebase/cbsMapRequest.asp (last
visited June 10, 2008); Phoenix Police Department Monthly Crime Maps,
http://phoenix.gov/POLICE/cristat_maps.html (last visited June 10, 2008); Pierce
County Neighborhood Crime Homepage, http://www.piercecountycrimedata.org/
(last visited June 10, 2008); Portland Police Bureau Maps and Statistics,
http://www.portlandonline.com/police/index.cfm?c=29795 (last visited June 10,
2008); San Antonio Police Department Current Crime Data and Maps,
http://www.sanantonio.gov/sapd/maps.asp?res=1344&ver=true#map (last visited
June
10, 2008);
San
Francisco
Police
Department
Crime
Maps,
http://www.sfgov.org/site/police_index.asp?id=23813 (last visited June 10, 2008);
Scottsdale Crime Data Maps, http://eservices.scottsdaleaz.gov/dmc/crimes/
default.asp (last visited June 10, 2008); St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department,
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Justice has created a clearinghouse website and program to develop
252
the technology. The growth of this technology will continue as will
the feasibility and ease of creating a statistically verifiable high-crime
area. This development will both reaffirm law enforcement’s faith in
the technology, but will also begin answering some of the questions
left open by the courts about how to conceptualize a high-crime area.
Adopting an empirical basis for a high-crime area designation is,
however, only the beginning. The real solution takes this starting
point and meshes it with some of the considerations and conclusions
of the federal appellate courts involving standards of proof,
particularity, specificity, and the relevance of the nexus between this
data and police actions on the street. In this way, the data that law
enforcement already relies on will become constitutionally relevant
and useable in Fourth Amendment hearings.
C. A Proposal for an Objective, Quantifiable Approach to a High-Crime
Area Designation
A proposal for an objective, quantifiable approach to determine
high-crime areas would necessarily have three component parts, each
of which the government would have the burden of proving to the
appropriate standard of proof. First, the area in question would have
to be demonstrated to be marked by a high incidence of
particularized criminal activity in comparison to neighboring areas
with objective and verifiable data. Second, the area at issue would
have to be narrowly tailored to a certain geographic location
(perhaps including particular blocks, housing complexes, parks, or
intersections) and would have to be current, limited to a recent
temporal finding of recent crime activity. Third, the nexus between
the particularized criminal activity and the officer’s observations
would have to be demonstrated. The goal is to provide guidance to
litigants and courts in Fourth Amendment suppression hearings
when the issue of a “high-crime area” is raised.

http://64.218.68.50/stlouis/newslmpd/viewer.htm (last visited June 10, 2008); St.
Paul Crime Maps, http://www.stpaul.gov/index.asp?nid=690 (last visited June 10,
2008); Toledo Police Department Crime Maps, http://www.toledopolice.com/
districtmaps.html (last visited June 10, 2008); Tulsa Police Department Map Central,
http://www.tulsapolice.org/mapcentral.html (last visited June 10, 2008); West Des
Moines Community Crime Mapping Web Site, http://crimeview.wdm-ia.com/CVC/
(last visited June 10, 2008); Wichita Police Department Crime Statistics,
http://www.wichita.gov/CityOffices/Police/Stats/Crimes_Stats.htm (last visited June
10, 2008).
252. U.S.
Department
of
Justice,
Office
of
Justice
Programs,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/maps/links.htm (last visited June 5, 2008).
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1.

Crime statistics and other verifiable data
In the high-crime area context, the central question will always be
whether an area is disproportionately affected by criminal activity. To
avoid imprecision, this area will have to be statistically or objectively
proven to have a higher incidence of crime than other relevant
253
254
Taking the invitation of NAPO, an objective statistical
areas.
approach would require the government to produce available crime
statistics about an area in the Fourth Amendment suppression
hearing. The trial court would thus have to evaluate this information
as part of the reasonable suspicion calculus. This additional step of
review is in line with Terry, in which the Supreme Court noted that
reasonable suspicion “becomes meaningful only when it is assured
that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the
laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a
judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or
255
seizure in light of the particular circumstances.”
In practical terms, this means that government attorneys would be
required to introduce some objective and verifiable evidence to
support the claim that an area is a high-crime area. This evidence
could consist of certified arrest or conviction statistics from the area.
In certain jurisdictions, the easiest mechanism would be to introduce
256
evidence that the arrest took place in official “hot spots,” “drug free

253. See United States v. Diaz-Juarez, 299 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Ferguson, J., dissenting) (stating that officer’s subjective viewpoint is not adequate
support for “high crime” area designation: “Agent Rodriguez testified that Terra del
Sol Road ‘was located in a high-crime area, relying on his speculative observations.
This testimony was a far cry from the ‘specific data’ required to support the assertion
that the stop took place in a ‘high-crime’ area.” (citations omitted)).
254. See NAPO Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 7 (allowing designation of highcrime area to be based on “verifiable and quantifiable data”).
255. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). This insight from Terry comes from
Professor Goldman’s 2001 article on Wardlow. See Goldman, supra note 23, at 572
(2001) (asserting that an officer’s insights and perspectives should not end the
inquiry in defining “reasonable suspicion” in a “high crime” area).
256. A hot spot is defined as “an area that has a greater than average number of
criminal or disorder events, or an area where people have a higher than average risk
of victimization.” JOHN ECK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MAPPING CRIME:
UNDERSTANDING
HOT
SPOTS
2
(2005),
available
at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/209393.pdf; see id. (“Areas of concentrated crime
are often referred to as hot spots. Researchers and police use the term in many
different ways. Some refer to hot spot addresses, others refer to hot spot blocks, and
others examine clusters of blocks.”) (citations omitted); see also Anselin et al., supra
note 25, at 222–23 (“A crime hot spot is a location, or small area with an identifiable
boundary, with a concentration of criminal incidents. These chronic crime places
where crime is concentrated at high rates over extended periods of time may be
analogous to the small percentage of chronic offenders who are responsible for a
large percentage of crime.”).
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258

Other means of
zones,” or other recognized areas of concern.
proof might be the introduction of maps of such designated areas in
a locality. Experts could even be called to testify on the subject. Even
less formalized proof might be allowed, consisting of police logs,
cataloged citizen complaints, or other official findings about a
particular area. Officers might even be able to testify about their own
arrests in locations as long as those arrests could be verified by proper
documentation (including police records or arrest reports). The key
modification would be a requirement of empirical data or
documentation that could be verified and compared by the trial
court.
Importantly, the prosecutor would be required to demonstrate that
the introduced statistics were higher than those of other neighboring
areas, and that the difference was significant for constitutional
purposes. To be relevant, there would have to be a baseline figure
for comparison. To challenge the government evidence, defense
lawyers would be entitled to introduce contrary statistics, experts,
records, or comparisons.
The difficult question remaining for courts to decide will be how
“high” a high-crime area must be to shift the Fourth Amendment
balance. Whether courts would be satisfied with a middle-of-therange determination, as with Wardlow’s District 11, remains to be
seen. It is a question currently unexamined because of the paucity of
empirical information and sustained analysis. However, over time an
established baseline of understanding will begin to develop about the
definition of a high-crime area in particular localities.
At a minimum, it would seem that for constitutional standards to
be shifted, the claim of a high-crime area must mean something
significant. To alter fundamental Fourth Amendment protections, it
would seem necessary that the area really be qualitatively different.
Designated high-crime areas in the top ten or twenty percent may
make the cut, but one would question whether the middle-ground
257. See Peter M. Flanagan, Trespass Zoning: Ensuring Neighborhoods a Safer Future by
Excluding Those with a Criminal Past, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 327, 331–32 (2003)
(comparing drug exclusion zones enacted in Portland, Oregon and Cincinnati,
Ohio); see id. at 334 (praising the effectiveness of drug-fee zones in reducing crime).
258. David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High Crime Settings, and a
Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 459 (1997) (“[M]uch crime—violent,
drug, property and domestic—is concentrated in certain neighborhoods, particularly
poor minority neighborhoods. More recently, attention has turned to ‘hot spots’
even within such neighborhoods. In Minneapolis, in 1986, only 3% of the city’s
street addresses produced 50% of calls for police service. In Boston, gang turf
representing less than 4% of the city accounted for more than 12% of the city’s
armed robberies and roughly a quarter of youth homicides, gun assaults, weapons
offenses, drug offenses, and calls for service regarding ‘shots fired.’”).
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259

In some way, the term itself
determinations should pass muster.
may have to be redefined with distinctions made between “high,”
“higher,” and “highest” crime designations.
This Article cannot resolve what is, in essence, the ultimate
question for courts considering the high-crime designation in
particular locations. The definitional questions addressed here and
in the following sections suggest the tools for analysis, but not a
universal answer. However, the only way courts will be able to adopt
an accurate and rigorous approach to localized high-crime areas is to
begin demanding this type of objective and empirical evidence.
2.

Geography and timing
To create a workable “high-crime area,” the statistics or data must
relate to a specific and particularized geographic area with set
260
boundaries.
In addition, the area must be a current high-crime
261
area, not necessarily a historic high-crime area. Thus, an empirical,
verifiable high-crime definition would also have to require a
geographic and temporal limitation.
In practical terms this will likely be determined by how the crime
statistics are collected in a particular jurisdiction. For example, in
Chicago during the Wardlow case, the city was broken up into police
262
As detailed in the NAPO amicus brief, the police were
districts.
confident enough in their collection strategy to propose a district263
wide categorization to the Supreme Court. However, it is likely that
the Chicago police had an even better understanding of the crime
259. One of the consequences of adopting a preponderance of evidence standard
(discussed later) may be to create a binary determination of what is a high-crime
area. For example, if an area is in the 51% category, does that mean it is really a
“high-crime area” for constitutional purposes? While it is higher than other areas, it
would seem that designating half an area (city, county, or even state) a high-crime
area will not survive sustained analysis. It would likely be struck down as overbroad
and overinclusive for any practical use.
260. See United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing
that an overly large or vague demarcation of a high-crime area might lead to
impermissible profiling, but because the “high crime” area in question was “a specific
intersection rather than an entire neighborhood[,]” the Court’s concerns were
alleviated).
261. See Stewart, supra note 204 (noting the revitalization efforts aimed at the
Georgia Avenue corridor in Washington, D.C.).
262. See NAPO Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 24 (“Chicago has 25 police
districts.”) The brief details how the district crime data show that District 11 (the
district in question in Wardlow) had a statistically higher crime rate than more than
half of the police districts in Chicago.
263. See id. at 7–8 (comparing data from District 11 with twenty-five police crime
districts in Chicago and concluding that, as a whole, District 11 is a high-crime area).
NAPO preemptively rejects any assertion that areas with large minority populations
are disproportionately targeted, because Chicago’s police districting system allows for
quantifiable crime reports. Id. at 8.
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264

In Washington,
patterns in the city than mere district summaries.
D.C., the Metropolitan Police Department offers a publicly accessible
website, in which one can find the number of crimes for a particular
265
Thus, while
block or intersection for the past two calendar years.
the Metropolitan Police Department also has a district-wide crime
mapping system, because more tailored street-by-street mapping
exists, it would make little sense to rely on an overbroad district-wide
categorization. Instead, in the District of Columbia, litigants should
be able to determine to a close degree of certainty the type and
266
frequency of a particular crime during a particular timeframe.
Looking at how various jurisdictions already catalogue their reports
of crime is the first step in determining the appropriate geographic
limitation.
How a jurisdiction maps crimes for its own internal purposes,
however, may not be the optimal designation for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. Crime does not necessarily remain localized to
267
a particular district. The effects of a particular block may well spill
268
over to other blocks or cross district lines. In addition, crime may
be centered on various buildings, stores, or residential complexes
269
that are located on those blocks. Sometimes, there will be a single
270
source point for criminal activity, be it a parking lot, alley, or park.
264. In fact, if one views the City of Chicago’s crime mapping database, one can
see a very sophisticated crime pattern analysis. See Chicago Police Department, Clear
Map Crime Incidents, http://gis.chicagopolice.org/CLEARMap/startPage.htm (last
visited June 10, 2008) (allowing users to retrieve results using searches based on a
variety of parameters, such as date range or specific geographic range like address,
beat, or school). The results can be as specific as within 1/8th of a mile of a
particular address.
265. See
District
of
Columbia,
Metropolitan
Police
Department,
http://crimemap.dc.gov/presentation/query.asp (last visited June 10, 2008)
(allowing the user to search for crime by specific address and also within 500, 1000,
or 1500 feet of that location). For example, between January 1, 2008, and April 1,
2008, there were twenty-two thefts within 1500 feet of the D.C. Superior Court at 500
Indiana Avenue NW. This type of crime is up 214% from the same date range last
year, when there were seven thefts within a 1500-foot radius of the courthouse.
266. Other jurisdictions, as evidenced by the City of Chicago’s website, have the
same capabilities. See supra note 251 (providing a list of websites maintained by cities
that track and map crime).
267. See Anselin et al., supra note 25, at 223 (“Fixed boundaries (e.g., census tracts,
police precincts, or uniform grid cells) have the advantage of giving rise to the
space/time series data commonly used for crime reporting and spatial modeling.
Their disadvantage is that hot spots may cross the fixed boundaries or vary in size.”).
268. See id. (noting that an alternative method of defining hot spot boundaries
through ad hoc clustering can “yield[] sizes and shapes tuned specifically to
individual hot spots”).
269. See id. at 223–24 (providing examples of hot spots in various cities that limit
boundaries to “no more than one linear block of a street” or to specific times of day).
270. In addition, it must be recognized that not all crime is reported or cataloged
even in the most sophisticated crime mapping program. See MARKOVIC & STONE,
supra note 28, at 2 (“No crime map reflects all crime. In order to appear on a map, a

2008]

THE “HIGH-CRIME AREA” QUESTION

1633

Certain neighborhoods may have safe areas and less safe areas. Thus,
the ability to view crime patterns within a larger geographic
understanding is important, and may mean that an alternative
method of defining a high-crime area is necessary. The question is
still how to cabin those “areas” so that they are useable in court and
271
meaningful for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The majority of jurisdictions will likely adopt a high-crime area
definition using existing metrics including districts or sub-districts
272
(usually police patrol areas) or particular streets. However, another
solution would be to create an accepted geographic radius as a unit
of measure for a high-crime area. For example, a 500-foot, 1000-foot,
or 1500-foot radius of the area around the arrest location could be
considered a fair geographic measure of an area. In the District of
Columbia, using the public crime mapping technology, one can view
a 500-foot, 1000-foot, or 1500-foot radius of the area in which the
273
crime occurs.
The mapping technology creates a shaded circular
crime must be reported, have a geographic reference, and be of sufficient priority to
be put on a map. . . . Among crimes that are reported to police, some do not have
geographic references. Financial fraud, extortion, and many forms of conspiracy do
not occur at fixed locations and are therefore rarely mapped. . . . Even for crimes
that occur at specific locations, such as armed robbery and sexual assault, police
agencies do not always record the location with enough detail to allow the incident
to be mapped. This is especially common when someone reports a crime at a police
station days after the event. . . . Even some jurisdictions with sophisticated crime
mapping programs choose not to map some forms of domestic violence, crimes
among juveniles, threats, defacing public property, and other criminal offenses.”).
271. The study of crime mapping technology and specifically hot spots is
incredibly complex and beyond the scope of this Article. The analysis can include
differentiating between hot spot places (specific addresses, corners, or other physical
places, robberies at ATMs or stores, drug dealing locations), hot spot streets
(corridors, avenues, alleys that encourage prostitution, robberies or street drug
dealing), hot spot areas (neighborhoods, multi-block concentrations that recognize
residential burglaries or gang activity), and repeat victim spots (domestic violence
cases). See ECK ET AL., supra note 256, at 5 (noting that the identification of hot spots
requires multiple techniques). In addition, based on the type of crime, there might
be different types of crime maps, including, for example, “dot maps” (for specific
addresses), “line maps” (for streets), and ellipse, choropleth, and isoline maps (for
broader areas). See id. at 9–10 (comparing different hot spot theories).
272. See Anselin et al., supra note 25, at 223 (“Perhaps the easiest means of
identifying hot spots is to partition a jurisdiction into a fixed set of boundaries (e.g.,
square grid cells, census block groups, or some other boundary set) and to develop a
set of rules (a ‘rule base’) using threshold values.”).
273. The technology allows a user to adjust the search from 100 feet to 1500 feet
from the location of the arrest. This is a common phenomenon with crime mapping
technology. See MARKOVIC & STONE, supra note 28, at 3 (“In general, crime mapping
projects rely on digital base maps created by government departments other than the
police. . . . The base maps themselves vary in the level of detail they provide. For
example, many cities contain informal settlements without planned streets or
services, and addresses in these areas may not have standard names or numbers. The
level of detail is important not only for display and analysis, but also for locating
crime incidents and contextual features on maps in the first place, a process known
as ‘geocoding.’
The geocoding process translates standard street address
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area around an arrest location with more detailed mapping of the
274
This localized
cross streets, houses, and other things in the area.
crime mapping technology may provide a better definition of a “highcrime area” than using predefined neighborhood labels or entire
275
police districts. Depending on the technology, this type of defined
radius could be adopted in particular locations. Thus, as a practical
matter in a Fourth Amendment hearing, an officer would testify that
he made an arrest at a particular location. Then, a review of a 1000foot radius of that location could be conducted to determine all of
the similar crimes over the past few months. The result would be an
accurate and verifiable number of crimes to compare with the entire
jurisdiction’s crime pattern.
The solution of a limited geographic area for a high-crime area
also solves the temporal issue of relying on historic high-crime areas
276
that no longer have the same incidence of crime. Again, by using
modern mapping technology such as the one provided in the District
of Columbia, one can search for crime patterns within the relevant
time period. Usually, a one- to three-month time period before the
arrest at issue will be the relevant time frame. Even if one extends
that period to sixth months or a year, the parties will at least have a
baseline idea of the amount of crime in a particular area. One of the
dangers of not restricting the inquiry to a particular time period is
that certain areas will never escape the perception being a high-crime
area. Neighborhoods should be judged on current facts rather than
277
a negative reputation or outdated history.
information into latitude and longitude coordinates so that the locations of criminal
incidents and contextual features such as parks and schools, boundaries of police
and neighborhood watch districts, and census tracts can be displayed on the maps.”).
274. See id. at 2–3 (“Crime maps are most useful when they display a variety of
geographical features that place crime data in context. . . . Some of these contextual
elements can be classified as crime generators or crime suppressors. Crime
generators may include shops with liquor licenses, shopping malls, gambling
establishments, concert venues, and the like. Crime suppressors may include police
stations, neighborhood watch areas, or designated safety corridors.”).
275. Of course, this radius would be unnecessary if police departments created
already predetermined maps of hot spot or high drug activity with specific streets
included.
276. See D.R. v. State, 941 So. 2d 536, 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that
because “[t]he evidence adduced established only that the officer’s knowledge of the
area was not current and that an undetermined number of narcotics arrests took
place there at some unknown time[,]” the government’s evidence of a high crime
area was insufficient); see also id. at 538 (“The burden of proof rests with the State,
and the officer’s testimony suggests strongly that more detailed evidence about the
current status of the neighborhood could have been provided. As it was, however,
the officer’s out-of-date conclusion, unreinforced by specific, contemporary
information, was legally insufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.”).
277. See Stewart, supra note 204 (noting the “renaissance” of an area of
Washington, D.C. “tattered by time, drugs, and neglect”).
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Refining the definition of a high-crime area to a defined
geographic and temporal area yields two main advantages for Fourth
Amendment purposes. In terms of geography, it provides a measure
of precision in creating a defined and limited area. This precision
prevents overbroad analysis of areas, limiting “high-crime areas” to
only those areas that deserve the label. Second, in requiring current,
updated high-crime designations it provides the ability for courts to
make an accurate determination of the conditions on the ground.
Deciding cases based on out-of-date determinations or incorrect
information is not relevant and should not be the basis for Fourth
Amendment decisions when better information exists.
3.

Nexus
The fact that a designated area statistically might be a high-crime
area does not end the analysis. That an area may have a heightened
number of crimes means little if this information is either not known
by the police officer or not related to the observation of that officer.
Central to the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion analysis is
the nexus between knowledge about an area and the observations of
an individual officer on the street.
One of the least discussed issues in the high-crime area debate is
278
The only reason a high-crime area is relevant is that it
relevance.
makes an officer’s “suspicion” about otherwise innocent conduct in
279
that area more reasonable. If the area is a high-crime area known
for burglaries, the sight of a man loitering with a bag over his
shoulder may mean something different than if the area is known as a
bus stop or transit point. However, if that area is known for
burglaries, the fact that an officer sees a hand-to-hand transfer of an
object for money (consistent with a drug deal) should add little to his
suspicion in that neighborhood. While he may be in a “high-crime
area,” there is no relevant connection between the character of the
neighborhood and what he observed.
A broad brush
characterization cannot withstand this type of specific and
280
particularized scrutiny.
278. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J.
214, 222 n.42 (1983) (“[U]nless there is some identity between the prevalent crime
and the crime suspected, a ‘crime-prone’ neighborhood does not increase the
probability that a particular crime is being committed.”).
279. See United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he
crimes that frequently occur in the area are specific and related to the reason for
which Caruthers was stopped. Thus, we are satisfied that we have not too easily
permitted the consideration of this factor.”).
280. See United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he
government established not just that Livingston Road suffers from general,
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In addition, the information about the area cannot simply be
collected at police headquarters and introduced at a suppression
hearing; it must be known before the officer makes his observation.
If an officer does not know the information before making the
observation, that information would be irrelevant to the
281
For the
reasonableness of the officer’s reasonable suspicion.
information about the neighborhood to have constitutional weight,
the officer would have to be educated on it and then base his or her
actions on that information.
The Wardlow case itself demonstrates the forgotten relevance of
nexus. According to the NAPO argument, the area in question was
known for a statistically high incidence of serious crimes—murder,
282
robbery, aggravated assault.
There was no statistical evidence of
drug crimes, but the evidence introduced (through non-statistical
283
testimony) was that the area was known for “high narcotics traffic.”
The officers were on patrol as part of their narcotics enforcement
duties and observed Sam Wardlow standing with a white bag on the
284
Would a trained officer seeing a man with an opaque bag
street.
think this was consistent with criminal activity of murder, robbery,
assault, or even drug dealing? Likely, the answer is no. So even in
the foundational case of Wardlow, we are left with arguably irrelevant
crime statistics creating a high-crime area and making a
constitutional difference for Fourth Amendment purposes. Properly
analyzed, Wardlow would likely be decided differently if the highcrime nexus were taken seriously. Even assuming that the officers on
patrol reasonably suspect the area in question was objectively a high
narcotics area, here, knowing that fact adds little to the
reasonableness of whether officers should know that criminal activity
was afoot based on the observation of flight while holding a white
bag.
undifferentiated ‘crime,’ but that it is home to the precise type of infractions—drug
and firearm offenses—that [Officer] Feirson suspected [Defendant] Edmonds of
committing.”).
281. This is simply a matter of logic. The legal relevance of the information is
how it affects the officer’s judgment on the street. If he did not know anything about
the area, it could not affect his judgment. Further, this information should not only
be relevant for the stop, but also the search. The information an officer has about
the particular crime patterns should also allow certain freedom and/or restraint in
terms of the scope of the search under the Fourth Amendment.
282. See NAPO Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 7 (“District 11 [the district in
question] had the highest number of murders and robberies, and the second highest
number of criminal sexual assaults and aggravated assaults, of all the police districts
in Chicago.”).
283. People v. Wardlow (Wardlow I), 678 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), aff’d,
701 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
284. Id.
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Of course, in some cases the expectation of the officers will be
central to the suspicion. In a high-drug area, the incidence of handto-hand transactions may well be sufficient to create reasonable
285
Such direct nexus between the
suspicion for a Terry stop.
expectation about the area and the officer’s observation should not
be overlooked by reviewing courts. Nexus is central to the relevance
of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis and the inclusion
of objective, verifiable statistics or information makes this relevance
analysis possible.
D. Standard of Proof
The final issue in creating an objective and verifiable standard for
high-crime areas is to decide on a standard of proof. It is,
unexpectedly, a complex and unsettled question, as courts have not
analyzed the issue in any great detail.
Under any standard, the government would have the burden of
justifying an infringement of an individual’s Fourth Amendment’s
rights. It must be the government’s burden to prove that there is an
“objective evidentiary justification” for the infringement of that
286
expectation of privacy.
Further, for an empirical statistical
approach to have any meaning, the standard of proof must be clear.
Two possible solutions to the standard of proof are proposed here.
One solution would be a preponderance of evidence standard. While
not required under existing law, the standard would have the
advantage of clarity. A trial court could simply determine whether
there is a significantly higher incidence of relevant crime in the
287
Like many points of
designated area based on available evidence.
285. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 3.6(g), at 366 (4th ed. 2004)
(“The courts have rather consistently concluded that ‘the incidence of a high crime
rate is a relevant circumstance to be considered in determining the existence of
probable cause,’ and properly so. . . . [I]f an officer observes a street corner
exchange of some substance for money, such an event takes on a special meaning if
it happens in a part of the community where drug traffic is intensive.”).
286. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968).
287. In certain civil cases involving the existence of high crime areas, courts have
been willing to demand crime data to determine the foreseeability of criminal
incidents and thus the viability of negligence claims. See, e.g., Oliver v. Abdul Prod.
II, Inc., No. 03-2240, 2005 WL 3478399, at *2–3 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2005) (stating that
“general crime statistics” are not sufficient to prove that harm is foreseeable); District
of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 33–34 (D.C. 1987) (accepting evidence of previous
violent crimes in school and surrounding area sufficient to prove notice of harm);
Asbell v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc., 497 S.E.2d 260, 264 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)
(rejecting security expert’s testimony because he lacked statistical data to back up
claim that location in question was in high crime area); Tex. Real Estate Holdings,
Inc. v. Quach, 95 S.W.3d 395, 398–99 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (relying on statistics from
census tract rather than those from police beat because tract more narrowly and
accurately reflected criminal activity of specific location of crime). Courts have
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disputed evidence, the trial court would decide, weighing the
proffered evidence.
However, as demonstrated in the Bonner debate, the
preponderance of evidence standard may not neatly fit a Fourth
Amendment reasonable suspicion calculus. Specifically, the language
from Wardlow states that reasonable suspicion “requires considerably
288
less” than the preponderance of evidence. Thus, the ultimate legal
standard is less than a preponderance of evidence, making it
somewhat counter-intuitive that the component facts of the
reasonable suspicion totality would have to be proven to a higher
standard. In other words, while the legal standard for the trial court
may be a lower bar of “reasonable suspicion,” each of the facts
supporting that reasonable suspicion might have to be proved to a
higher preponderance of evidence standard.
As an example, imagine a scenario in which, at a Fourth
Amendment suppression hearing, the government introduced
evidence to support the claim that the suspect “fled” at the sight of
police. The testimony to support this claim was that the suspect, a
young man, observed the presence of police and walked rapidly into
a building while tucking an unknown object quickly into his bag. A
trial court deciding how to evaluate whether there was evidence of
flight would have to evaluate the facts to some legal standard.
Walking rapidly is a fact. Whether the suspect walked rapidly enough
to be considered flight from officers would be a fact with legal
considerations. It would not be unreasonable for a trial court to use
a preponderance standard as a default standard to determine if, in
fact, this fact had been established. A judge could say, “Yes, the
young man walked rapidly away from officers, I can find that to a
preponderance standard.” However, without more, this fact may not
be sufficient for the legal conclusion that the young man fled at the
sight of police. It would, however, be one fact included in the totality
of circumstances analysis necessary for reasonable suspicion.
Similarly, with high-crime areas, the judge could say,

cautioned that findings of the foreseeability of crime in a specific area should be
based on well-defined reports of crime statistics. See Timberwalk Apartments,
Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 757 (Tex. 1998) (noting that “[s]tatistics
regarding large or undefined geographic areas do not by themselves make crime
foreseeable at a specific location.”).
288. See Illinois v. Wardlow (Wardlow III), 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (“While
‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth
Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification . . . .”).
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I find that the area in which the young man walked is a known
high drug area.
The prosecution has shown that this
neighborhood has one of the highest incidences of drug crime in
the city. The prosecution has provided official arrest statistics that
demonstrate that this neighborhood is a recognized problem area
for drugs and guns, compared to other areas in the city. I can find
by a preponderance that the area is a high crime area, and will
factor that into my Fourth Amendment calculus.

The two facts: that the young man walked rapidly away from police
officers, and that the area is a high-crime area are, thus proved to a
higher standard than the ultimate reasonable suspicion legal analysis,
without harm done to the legal standard. The court is still making
the ultimate legal conclusion based on existing constitutional
standards. The court’s conclusion regarding the high-crime area,
however, may not end the analysis. If, for example, the young man
were a student at a law school in a high-crime area, the building were
a library, and the object a cell phone, the court could well balance
the facts to come to a different legal conclusion about reasonable
suspicion. Yet, in terms of the standard of proof, there is little reason
to lower the standard below a preponderance of evidence for each of
the individual facts under consideration by the trial court.
However, this type of preponderance analysis was exactly what the
289
Third Circuit discussed and apparently rejected in Bonner.
Recognizing the debate in Bonner, this Article would also offer
another alternative standard of proof based in part on Judge McKee’s
dissent. It would be a lesser standard than a preponderance of
evidence, but still have sufficient analytical force to protect individual
liberties. Instead of positing the reviewing standard as a “subjective
290
belief of the arresting officer” that “must be objectively reasonable,”
this Article would require a subjective belief that is objectively
reasonable, and objectively accurate. The reviewing court would have to
determine: (1) if the police officer had a subjective belief that the
area was a high-crime area; (2) that this belief was objectively
289. United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 222 n.5 (McKee, J., dissenting). In
part, this was because Judge Smith chose to rely on the “factual inferences” of the
officer to help shape the understanding of the neighborhood. See id. at 219 (Smith,
J., concurring) (noting that a law enforcement officer might have background
knowledge about criminal activity of area not reflected by empirical data such as
arrest records). The difference between an officer relying on a factual inference
about a neighborhood and a court reviewing the objective facts about a
neighborhood is a subtle, but critical shift. Relying on police officers to provide
factual inferences about a neighborhood is, in essence, to allow officers and not the
court to shape the conclusion of whether an area is, in fact, a high crime area. See
supra note 234.
290. Id. at 222 n.5 (McKee, J., dissenting).
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reasonable, and (3) that this assessment about the neighborhood was,
291
in fact, accurate based on existing data.
The third, added step would be to see if the officer’s subjective
belief based on objective information correlates with the actual
objective data available about the area. Courts would review the
government’s proffer of statistics or other data about the area in light
of the officer’s subjective assessment of the area. The defense would
also be able to challenge those facts with their own contrary objective
data if it existed. If the court determined that there existed accurate
and verified data about a defined high-crime area and that the officer
correctly relied on accurate data, then the objective standard would
be met. The difference between this and the preponderance of
evidence standard is that under this lesser standard the court would
not have to determine as a fifty-one percent fact that the area was a
high-crime area, only that the officer relied on objectively accurate
information about the area. It still would be the court, not the
292
officer, making the factual determination.
V. CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO
HIGH-CRIME AREAS
To summarize, a requirement of verifiable and quantitative high
crime evidence would require several steps. First, in a Fourth
291. In practical terms, this proposed standard would mean that the court would
have to be satisfied not only that the arresting officer knew through some objective
means that the area was a high crime area, but that the officer was correct in that
belief. Thus, the first step would be to look at what the officer knew. The officer’s
subjective knowledge could be shown through incident reports, prior arrest logs, or
other forms of proof short of official statistics. The second step would be to see if
this subjective belief was objectively reasonable. Most times the officer’s subjective
belief will be based on some set of collected objective facts, including reports,
briefings, or experience about the area. An officer whose subjective belief was not
based on any prior information or experience could not survive this second step.
However, in most cases there is some objective basis for the subjective belief, even if
it cannot be quantified or verified (or even if it is actually incorrect). As discussed
above, it is this third step of analyzing and comparing the objective data that ensures
that the suspicion about a neighborhood is anchored in accurate and verified
information.
292. The difference between this and the Bonner standard of Judge McKee is
demonstrated in the following example: An officer could testify that a particular
block is known to be a high-drug area (step one). He could explain that this
subjective belief is based on official arrest reports from the area that show three
arrests a month for the past six months. The officer’s belief thus would be based on
objective facts (step two). However, if it could shown that there were one hundred
other blocks with three arrests a week, or three arrests a day, it could be shown that, in
fact, this was not a high drug block compared to other places in the city. Further, if
the defense could show that there were over ten designated hot spots and that they
were not near the block at issue, it would undermine the high-crime area claim.
Only by requiring the third step of review can there be any confidence that certain
areas are, in fact, higher crime areas.
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Amendment suppression hearing, the government must introduce
objective, verifiable data about the level of crime in a particular area,
as compared to other comparable areas in the region. This evidence
can be admitted through crime statistics, crime maps, designated hotspot or red-zone maps, verifiable arrest data, crime report data,
expert testimony, or other official police information. The statistical
evidence must be current to the time of the arrest. The statistical
data must relate to a particular and circumscribed area. This area
must be limited and described using existing police districts,
established neighborhood demarcations, particular intersections or
streets, or previously designated areas or a specified radius. For
example, in hot spot areas, having a north, south, east, and west
boundary would be required. For a radius, a specified number of feet
would be appropriate. Second, this particularized knowledge about
an area must be demonstrated to be known to the officer before
making the arrest, so as to establish the nexus between the relevance
of the high-crime area and the reasonable suspicions of the officer.
Third, the trial court would have to make a factual finding about
whether the area was objectively a high-crime area. Finally, the trial
court would have to analyze whether this fact affected the Fourth
Amendment reasonable suspicion analysis.
The requirement of objective data in Fourth Amendment hearings
will present concerns for both prosecutors and defense lawyers.
From the prosecution side, the requirement creates an additional
burden of production. While the statistics may be available to most
police departments, they might not be as accessible to line
prosecutors. One can imagine that while a police captain might have
293
a virtual or actual pushpin map of every crime in his jurisdiction, a
prosecutor may not be privy to such information. In addition, for the
statistics to mean anything they will need to be current to the month
near the alleged offense. New channels of communication may need
to be created to facilitate this flow of information from the police to
the prosecutor. In those jurisdictions that do maintain such crime
statistics, however, it should not be too difficult to produce the
294
Certainly, once courts begin
materials to be introduced in court.
demanding such data, prosecutors’ offices will respond. In many

293. See MARKOVIC & STONE, supra note 28, at 1 (“For decades, police agencies have
relied on wall maps to detect patterns in the locations of certain crimes, but the
recent use of computers to map crime has greatly increased the value of mapping.”).
294. This mechanism could be as simple as having the police print out the
publicly available information before coming to court.
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jurisdictions the information exists in the public record and merely
needs to be organized for submission to the court.
From a defense perspective, the introduction of objective crime
statistic data also presents some real concerns. At a conceptual level,
it legitimates an otherwise ambiguous and usually contestable
argument of the government. The otherwise vague opinions of a
police officer now will be replaced with evidence that can be given
constitutional weight. This may mean that courts will be more willing
to factor “high-crime area” considerations into their Fourth
Amendment analysis. Further, in lending the veneer of objectivity, it
minimizes the racial- and class-based assumptions that may be built
295
Also, with the police
into “reasonable suspicion” determinations.
department controlling the collection and dissemination of statistics
and data, there is a concern with police officials’ ability to influence
Fourth Amendment determinations. There will be an incentive to
label certain areas “high crime” to focus police resources and
attention on those areas. This may create a self-fulfilling situation,
whereby police targeting of certain areas will result in more arrests
and thus more latitude to stop even more people based on a lower
standard of reasonable suspicion. On the other hand, for defense
lawyers, verifiable data will allow challenges to previously
unchallengeable assertions of police officers in Fourth Amendment
hearings. It now will be possible empirically to refute assertions of
officers and demand a more accurate assessment of neighborhood
characteristics.
Despite these concerns, moving toward an objective, statistics-based
approach to high-crime areas will ultimately offer courts the
significant advantage of clarity and a measure of intellectual honesty
to an otherwise malleable term. As observed in the discussion in Part
II, reliance on inexact, subjective beliefs leads to inconsistent and
unverifiable findings. If Fourth Amendment protections are to be
constitutionally altered (either explicitly or implicitly) in particular
areas, courts should carefully consider the characteristics of those
areas to focus the analysis on more objective metrics. Because the
data and collection measures now exist to determine whether
statistics show that one area objectively has more crime than another,
295. See Johnson, supra note 278, at 255 (“With other factors, prejudice may be
hidden in the police officer’s ‘expertise.’ For example, when a police officer
describes a neighborhood as ‘high crime’ or ‘drug-prone,’ a court cannot exercise
the judicial detachment relied upon with factors involving overt prejudice. The
court may completely accept the expertise, risking that the officer’s prejudice about
ghetto neighborhoods clouds his evaluation of the probability of crime contributed
by the neighborhood.”).
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courts should be demanding this information on a regular basis.
Like many contestable facts, high-crime areas will not be easily
defined, but the debate will help improve the analysis.
Adopting this requirement for objective and verifiable evidence
accomplishes several constitutional and practical goals. First, it
strengthens the protection of individual rights by requiring the
government to justify an infringement on liberty. In addition, it
grounds the objective nature of Fourth Amendment analysis in real
data and limits the area in question to a specific and particularized
geographical and temporal area. It ensures that the information is
used only in appropriate cases requiring courts to find a nexus
between the area and the suspicions of the officer. Finally, it provides
an incentive to improve intelligence-based crime-solving
technologies.
This last point should not be forgotten. Establishing an objective,
data-supported standard not only strengthens constitutional
protections, but improves local policing and community
296
Data driven policing is a reality of modern law
involvement.
enforcement. The requirement to collect and utilize existing
information with existing tools can only benefit the effectiveness of
police. Similarly, this information should be shared with community
297
stakeholders who have an interest in a safe community. The highcrime area designation has many consequences, from depressing
economic investment and home prices, to increasing public funds to
underserved districts. Using this information in court will simply
sharpen the collection mechanisms and provide a better sense of the
crime patterns of an area.
From a constitutional perspective, the addition of some objective,
verifiable data will benefit trial courts that are otherwise ill-equipped
to make judgments about the character of a neighborhood.
Eventually, the repetition of cases and areas will be such that some
order will be placed on local jurisdictions in terms of high crime
spots. Judges may soon come to know the repeat problem areas, and
also have a comparative benchmark in terms of rates of crime.

296. See MARKOVIC & STONE, supra note 28, at 7 (“The three most common uses of
computerized crime mapping are to measure police performance, solve specific
crime problems, and inform the public. Police agencies that use maps to measure
their own performance and hold themselves accountable are typically trying to
monitor changes in crime over time or to compare crime levels in different
districts.”).
297. See id. at 11 (examining ways in which crime statistics can be used by
community members as well as government officials to allow for community-wide
strategies for crime reduction and prevention).
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Determinations such as legislatively designated hot-spots or red zones
will simplify some judicial decisions. However, the real definition will
only be determined through cases, as litigants argue about the
specific areas, patterns, and their relevance to the particular case
before the court.

